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I. INTRODUCTION
For generations, school children have sung Samuel Smith's America,
reaffirming that they lived in a "sweet land of liberty." 1 And from early on,
symbols embodying personal freedom, including the Liberty Bell and, later, the
Statue of Liberty, have been omnipresent in American life. Property, though
ostensibly granted equal billing in the Constitution, has long played a less
inspiring role. There is no property bell. But the differences are not merely
symbolic. By the latter half of the twentieth century, courts were scrutinizing
1. Samuel F. Smith, America, in POEMS OF AMERICAN PATRIOTISM: 1776-1898, at 1 (R.L.
Paget ed., 1898) (1831).
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liberty-infringing government action with the strictest care, while deferring to
legislatures with respect to virtually all property related claims.
2
Symbolically beginning with Richard Epstein's 1985 book Takings: Private
Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Takings),3 a movement emerged
contesting liberty's primacy in social and constitutional ordering.4 Despite
limited success in the courts,5 or perhaps because of it,6 this movement has lost
none of its vigor. Activists continue to sponsor federal, state, and local
legislative reforms and constitutional amendments designed to strengthen
property rights.7 Jurists ranging from William Brennan to William Rehnquist to
Janice Rogers Brown authored opinions calling for equivalent scrutiny of liberty
2. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 140 (3d ed. 2008) ("[The Supreme Court] instituted a double
standard of constitutional review under which [it] afforded a higher level of judicial protection to
the preferred category of personal rights. Economic rights were implicitly assigned a secondary
constitutional status.").
3. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985).
4. See, e.g., Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis
and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509, 510 (1998) (noting the
influence of Epstein's Takings in doctrinal development); Michael Allan Wolf, Looking Backward:
Richard Epstein Ponders the "Progressive" Peril, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1233, 1235 (2007) (stating
that Epstein's Takings "launched the modem private-property-rights movement").
5. The United States Supreme Court has largely rejected the property rights movement's
arguments. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (holding that the City
of New London's proposed condemnations were for a "public use" within the meaning of the
Takings Clause). They have met with greater success in some state courts. See, e.g., County of
Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Mich. 2004) (concluding that a county's
condemnations, while authorized under statute, did not "pass constitutional muster" under the
Michigan Constitution); City of Norwood v. Homey, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1129 (Ohio 2006) ("Ohio
has always considered the right to property to be a fundamental right.").
6. Many responded with particular outrage to the Court's decision in Kelo, 545 U.S. 469,
which permitted a taking and transfer of the property to a private owner in order to stimulate
economic growth, id. at 490. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of
Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 103 (2006) ("[T]he opinion set off a firestorm of
popular outrage .... ). In a potentially tongue-in-cheek response, a developer sought to develop a
hotel on New Hampshire property owned by Justice Souter, who had joined the Kelo majority. The
developer argued that the Lost Liberty Hotel, as it was to be called, would generate more tax
revenue and provide greater economic benefits to the town than Souter's home. Freestar Media,
LLC, http://www.freestarmedia.com/hotellostliberty2.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
7. More than 100 bills limiting the government's taking power were introduced in the wake
of Kelo. Patricia E. Salkin, Swift Legislative (Over)Reaction to Eminent Domain: Be Careful What
You Wish For, PROB. & PROP., July-Aug. 2006, at 44, 44. See generally Lynda J. Oswald,
Property Rights Legislation and the Police Power, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 527 (2000) (exploring
legislation addressing compensation requirements). A property rights group, the Castle Coalition,
claims that forty-two states adopted restraints on the use of eminent domain for economic
development after Kelo. CASTLE COALITION, 50 STATE REPORT CARD 1 (2007)
http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/report-card/50StateReport.pdf (last visited Oct.
29, 2008).
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and property claims.8 And a steady stream of books with provocative titles-
The Guardian of Every Other Right,9 Property and Freedom,10 and Cornerstone
of Liberty-beat the movement's drum.12  Epstein himself relentlessly
advocates for greater scrutiny of property claims, both in the courts 13 and in the
academy, recently reiterating his commitment to "parity between liberty and
property in the constellation of constitutionality, and, by implication, political
values." 
14
Taken together, this body of work casts the property rights movement
conservatively as either (1) an effort to recapture an historic America in which
judges, unlike modern courts, vigorously scrutinized property claims; or (2) as a
jurisprudential imperative, in the sense that rights equally positioned in the Bill.... 15
of Rights must be accorded the same level of judicial protection.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. ELY, supra note 2.
10. RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM (1999).
11. TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, CORNERSTONE OF LIBERTY: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 21ST CENTURY
AMERICA (2006).
12. Academic conferences and law review articles addressing the property rights debate are
as popular as ever. Over the last three years, the William and Mary and University of San Diego
law schools have hosted property rights symposia and published numerous law review articles.
See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Takings: An Appreciative Retrospective, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
439 (2006) (evaluating the legacy of Richard Epstein's book Takings); James W. Ely, Impact of
Richard A. Epstein, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 421, 422-23 (2006) (discussing the prominence
of Epstein's work in court opinions); Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the
Foundations of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Epstein, Liberty
Versus Property?] (detailing the tension between liberty and property in copyright law); Richard
A. Epstein, Taking Stock of Takings: An Author's Retrospective, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
407, 407 (2006) [hereinafter Epstein, Author's Retrospective] (responding to other authors'
comments about Takings); Eduardo M. Pefilaver, Reconstructing Richard Epstein, 15 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 429 (2006) (disagreeing with Professor Epstein's ideas about property).
Interesting recent articles include Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property
Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549 (2003) [hereinafter Claeys, Natural Property Rights]
(reexamining federal takings law in light of eminent domain cases decided in the nineteenth
century), and Joseph L. Sax, Why America Has a Property Rights Movement, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV.
513 (2005) (discussing factors to consider when land use rules are created after substantial
development occurs).
13. See Wolf, supra note 4, at 1242-43.
14. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property?, supra note 12, at 2; see also Epstein, Author's
Retrospective, supra note 12, at 408-09 (responding to recent commentary on Takings).
15. PIPES, supra note 10, at 287-88; Epstein, Author's Retrospective, supra note 12, at 413
("Justices on all sides of the intellectual spectrum do not want to own up to the breadth of the
Takings Clause, by reading it in parity with, say, the First Amendment protection of freedom of
speech."). In Takings, Epstein appears to rely on history, but he claimed that he was articulating a
radical theory without necessary historical support. Proceedings of the Conference on Takings of
Property and the Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 49, 66 (1986) [hereinafter Proceedings]
(statement of Richard Epstein addressing criticisms of Takings). In subsequent work, however, he
has tied his belief in strict scrutiny to historical and jurisprudential roots. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
[VOL. 60:1
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This Article critiques the movement's self-conscious conservatism,
showing that history, modern jurisprudence, and existing property rights theory
all fail to support strict judicial review of property regulation. Despite
considerable searching, no one has convincingly identified an era in which
property rights were strictly protected. If there has been an historical,
intellectual, judicial, or social tradition that supports scrutinizing property rights
in the manner that courts now review liberty claims, it has hidden itself
extremely well.
The case for extending modern strict scrutiny of liberty claims to property
claims is no less problematic. To be sure, the rhetoric of balance between libertyS 16
and property resonates with many judges. After all, the Framers protected both
in the Bill of Rights. But this appeal is a vestige of the linguistic decision to
categorize both liberty and property as rights. The structure and techniques of
legal argument lead us to equate concepts that we choose to group in the same
category, even though we could readily distinguish them. 17 When courts have
faced a concrete choice between substantive property and liberty interests, the
persuasive power of the rhetoric of parity has evaporated, and the courts have
privileged liberty.18 Justice White put it most succinctly, recognizing for the
Court that "the stakes are higher" when personal liberty is threatened.
19
Because neither history nor current jurisprudential practice supports
elevating property to liberty's level in the constitutional lexicon of rights, a
strong property rights adherent must articulate theoretical grounds for creating a
new social and legal regime. The movement's proponents have articulated both
natural rights20 and utilitarian21 models. Neither has been successful. The
natural rights theories cannot counter the critique that property achieves its
value through collective action and thus should be subject to collective limit in
ways that liberty should not. The utilitarian argument relies on false
assumptions about the certainty and incentive effects of a strong property rights
EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 115 (2006) (discussing historical
support for Epstein's theory).
Some commentators outside the traditional property rights movement call for greater scrutiny
of property rights claims based on an evolution in the law that is neither historical nor derivative of
the existing scheme of strict scrutiny for enumerated constitutional rights. See, e.g., RANDY E.
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 327 (2004)
(citing Lockean political theory); JOHN RYSKAMP, THE EMINENT DOMAIN REVOLT: CHANGING
PERCEPTIONS IN A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL EPOCH 117-20 (2007) (applying the "how not why"
analysis). These arguments are beyond the scope of the critique in this Article.
16. See discussion infra Part W.A.
17. See discussion infra Part 1V.B.
18. See discussion infra Part 1V.C.
19. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318-19 (1976).
20. See discussion infra Part V.A.
21. See discussion infra Part V.B.
2008]
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regime, while failing to provide an empirical response to claims that increased
scrutiny would have significant costs.
At its root, the debate over the proper degree of scrutiny for property rights
claims is a debate about the appropriate scope of a society's freedom to
organize and reshape itself in search of a greater good. As Jennifer Nedelsky
has written, our definition of property "reflects judgments about the nature of
freedom and justice, about the good society, and about what sorts of values a
government can and should foster."22 Strong individual property rights and
strict scrutiny of regulation truncate that fundamental debate, demanding that
we privilege what has been to guard against the hazards of the unknown. Social
betterment must come from individuals pursuing their own self-interest, for no
other interest is legitimate. Greater judicial deference, by contrast, frees us to
seek, through governmental actors pursuing the public interest, a better, more
fulfilling society at the risk that we will fail.
This Article's critical assessment of the property rights movement cannot
establish that judicial deference to legislative judgment in property rights cases
is necessarily morally superior to more probing scrutiny. That the property
rights movement's adherents have gained no ground in the more than two
decades since they began, however, casts some measure of doubt on the
possibility that they ever will.
Part II identifies the concepts of property and liberty in constitutional
jurisprudence and outlines the current state of constitutional law with respect to
each right. Part III critiques the historical case for a regime of strong property
rights within American intellectual, constitutional, and social history,
concluding that property rights adherents have failed to show that such a regime
has ever existed in the United States. Part IV identifies three examples of
judicial rhetoric in modern case law advocating equivalent scrutiny of liberty
and property rights and shows that this rhetoric loses its persuasive force when
judges face a concrete choice between liberty and property interests. Part V
summarizes and critiques the natural rights and utilitarian defenses of strong
property rights, finding neither persuasive.
II. PROPERTY AND LIBERTY RIGHTS IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
This Part explores the range of concepts that the terms property and liberty
can encompass and identifies those that best fit within constitutional
jurisprudence. It then summarizes existing law concerning judicial review of
liberty and property claims.
22. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 198 (1990).
[VOL. 60:1
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A. Defining Property and Liberty Rights
The definition of liberty in constitutional terms starts by recognizing (1) an
individual right prohibiting government interference with freedom of thought
and action coupled with (2) a power to call upon the government to protect
individuals from liberty-limiting harm (i.e., physical restraint) inflicted by
nongovernmental actors. Property recognizes (1) an individual right to acquire
things and intangibles for individual use or disposition without government
interference and (2) the power to call upon the government to enforce a property
owner's right to exclude others from using or disposing of his acquired
property.
Despite their common use in both everyday language and in the
Constitution, the terms property and liberty can be seen as interacting in at least
four distinct ways. First, some scholars understand the terms as a unified
concept describing the relationship between individual and government power.
For example, Timothy Sandefur has described liberty and property as two tenses
of the same right. 23 Under this view, the concept of liberty includes the personal
freedom to obtain, use, and dispose of property without outside interference.
Similarly, one understanding of property defines it simply as the liberty to
acquire and enjoy things.
2 4
Second, others interpret property as the antithesis of liberty. Property rights
in one person necessarily restrain the ability of others to live autonomously
because property rights limit freedom of action.25 An extreme version of this
approach views the concept of trespass as undermining liberty. 26
23. SANDEFUR, supra note 11, at 52, 56 (deriving this view from Locke's writings).
24. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, Property, NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in THE
MIND OF THE FOUNDER 186, 186 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981) (recognizing that the
meaning of property embraces anything of value, including opinions and ideas that the definition
of liberty normally encompasses). Adam Mossoff's description of property as an integrated
concept to acquire, use, and dispose of things fits within this understanding. Adam Mossoff, What
is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 402403 (2003) ("The
substantive role of acquisition, use and disposal derive from the fact that property is a consequent
of the actions necessary to maintain life and liberty.... The liberty and use of one's life and limbs
are as much a part of property as the power to exclude others from the objects to which one claims
entitlement).
25. This argument has found a voice among those opposing the expansion of intellectual
property rights. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 11 (2001), for a discussion of
constitutional rights and the freedom to innovate.
26. See G.A. COHEN, SELF-OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM, AND EQUALITY 55-56 (1995); Claeys,
Natural Property Rights, supra note 12, at 1560-61, 156748; Robert L. Hale, Coercion and
Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. Sci. Q. 470, 470 (1923). But see
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM: A MODERN CASE FOR CLASSICAL LIBERALISM
110-14, 132-38 (2003), for a critique of this position.
2008]
7
Semeraro: Sweet Land of Property?: The History, Symbols, Rhetoric, and Theo
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
A third variant interprets the concepts of liberty and property as limits on
each other. In this sense, liberty ideally means absolute freedom of thought and
action, while property ideally means the absolute freedom to reduce the external
world into segments for an individual's use and enjoyment and from which all
others can be excluded. Since individuals live in a social setting, however, the
ideal forms cannot exist.27 Each concept must limit or set a boundary for the
other.28 The liberty rights of others limit the individual's ability to acquire
property interests, and the property rights of others limit the individual's
exercise of liberty.
The fourth understanding of property and liberty interprets them as
components in a social system. Rather than focus on an absolute individual right
that must be limited because we happen to live with others, this definition starts
with the notion that the concepts of liberty and property exist only because we
live with others. Just as an individual living in the Amazon rain forest has little
need for a concept of snow, an individual living alone needs no concept of
liberty and property.29 Such a person can exercise absolute freedom of action or
acquisition.
Within a society, any notion of absolute freedom to exercise liberty or
acquire property is senseless because the concept of society necessitates limits.
But liberty and property do not bound each other. Rather, each forms a separate
sphere within the society employing the concepts. One does not have less
liberty because others have property. Liberty is simply not so broad as to
transgress the property of others, and vice versa. There is some play in the
joints. The social definitions of the concepts of property and liberty are not
27. The Austrian economist and philosopher Ludwig von Mises has articulated this view. In
his lecture Liberty and Property, he describes liberty as "always freedom from the government. It
is the restriction of the government's interference." Ludwig von Mises, Liberty and Property (Oct.
1958), http://mises.org/libprop.asp. But he recognizes that perfect liberty cannot exist: "[S]ociety
cannot realize the illusory concept of the individual's absolute independence. Within society
everyone depends on what other people are prepared to contribute to his well-being in return for
his own contribution to their well-being." Id.
28. See 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 107 (1973) ("Law, liberty, and
property are an inseparable trinity. There can be no law in the sense of universal rules of conduct
which does not determine boundaries of the domains of freedom by laying down rules that enable
each to ascertain where he is free to act."); NEDELSKY, supra note 22, at 90-93 (discussing the
view that property is "the boundary to political liberty"); Epstein, Liberty Versus Property?, supra
note 12, at 16 ("That liberty includes the ability to go where one wills, and this right of movement
is necessarily limited by the creation of any system of private property, which converts free
movement into trespass.").
29. See BARNETT, supra note 15, at 84 ("[Liberty] rights would be entirely unnecessary if
individuals were not in society with each other, or if the actions of some persons did not adversely
affect the welfare of others.").
[VOL. 60:1
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inherent. They involve choices about how the individuals in a society want to
live.
30
This fourth understanding of liberty and property best describes how these
terms are used in constitutional adjudication. The Constitution's language and
the cases interpreting it are most comfortably read to recognize two separate
concepts that do not strictly limit each other but rather that can be interpreted
within a broad range while still fulfilling their constitutional role.
31
B. Judicial Scrutiny of Property and Liberty Rights
The modern concept of federal constitutional review of government action
allegedly impinging liberty and property rights is now well settled. Despite the
inevitable impact on individual liberty or property, the courts generally uphold
government action against constitutional challenge, so long as the action is
rationally related to a legitimate public interest. Under this standard, courts
ask only "whether any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be
assumed" support the government actor' s judgment.33
The courts scrutinize much more strictly, however, the liberty interests
specifically enumerated in the Constitution, as well as certain other liberty
30. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), perhaps best conveys this social understanding of liberty and
property rights. Justice Frankfurter argued that all Constitutional rights required breathing space:
The tendency of focusing attention on constitutionality is to make constitutionality
synonymous with wisdom, to regard a law as all right if it is constitutional .... [M]uch
which should offend a free-spirited society is constitutional. Reliance for the most
precious interests of civilization, therefore, must be found outside of their vindication in
courts of law. Only a persistent positive translation of the faith of a free society into the
convictions and habits and actions of a community is the ultimate reliance against
unabated temptations to fetter the human spirit.
Id. at 670-71 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
31. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-84 (1980) (recognizing
that the state has the positive power to extend freedom of speech, a liberty interest, onto certain
forms of private property without violating constitutionally protected property rights). There may
be a limit to this flexibility, however. See id. at 93-95 (Marshall, J., concurring).
32. Gerald Gunther, in his classic article on the Court's differing levels of constitutional
scrutiny, described this approach as "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact." Gerald
Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
33. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938). And the Court has
proven itself willing to imagine justifications for economic regulation beyond those put forward by
the state itself. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 490 (1955) (justifying sales
of eyeglasses for advertising purposes); Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110
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interests thought to be fundamental to American society. 34 In these cases, the
government must show that infringing the individual interest in question is
necessary to serve, and narrowly tailored to promote, a compelling government
interest. 5
The Court does not extend this form of strict scrutiny to property rights. 36 It
has invoked the Takings Clause to compel compensation in limited cases where
the government regulates in a way that dramatically limits the use and reduces
the value of private property. 37 The standard of review, however, has not
strayed far from the permissive rational basis test. 38 With the exception of cases
34. These include the rights protected in the Bill of Rights as well as the right to vote,
assemble, travel, marry, and procreate. See Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is
this Right Different from All Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781, 786-87 n.15 (1994).
35. See, e.g., Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586 (2005) (citing Timmons v. Twin Cities
Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997)) ("Regulations that impose severe burdens on
associational rights must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."); Johnson v.
California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200,
227 (1995)) (discussing the government's burden of proof for racial classification cases); Boy
Scouts of Am v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
623 (1984)) (stating that regulations overriding the freedom of expressive association must survive
strict scrutiny).
Gunther defined strict scrutiny as "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gunther, supra note 32,
at 8. A recent study indicates that strict scrutiny is no longer, if it ever was, "fatal in fact." Adam
Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 796 (2006). For a recent discussion of how courts have in
fact applied the strict scrutiny standard, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54
UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1274 (2007).
36. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4 (1938). And placing a few dissenting
opinions to one side, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 505-23 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 343-
54 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 355-56 (Thomas, J., dissenting), the Supreme Court
has given no indication that one should expect dramatic change in the near future. The Court has
adopted and repeatedly affirmed highly deferential tests for determining whether a taking is for a
public use, Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480-83; Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1007, 1014-16
(1984); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26, 33 (1954), and whether a regulation constitutes a taking, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978). In Penn Central, the Court refused to find a taking despite a
large loss in value where "[t]he restrictions imposed are substantially related to the promotion of
the general welfare and not only permit reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site but also
afford... opportunities further to enhance not only the [regulated] site proper but also other
properties." Id.; see also Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 342 (rejecting a per se analysis and reaffirming
the Penn Central test in a case involving an extended moratorium); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S. 606, 630-31 (2001) (stating the same where a regulation reduced the value of property by
more than 90%).
37. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
38. Compare Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1007 ("[Where the owner] is aware of the conditions
under which the data [required under federal law for pesticide registration] are submitted, and the
conditions are rationally related to a legitimate Government interest, a voluntary submission of
data by an applicant in exchange for the economic advantages of a registration can hardly be called
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. .. . .39involving permanent physical invasions of property or regulation that removes4 0
all economic value, the Court presumes that a land use regulation is
constitutional even when it eliminates important use rights and dramatically
reduces value.41 As a result, the courts subject liberty and property claims to
starkly different levels of scrutiny.
III. HISTORICAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Many commentators have argued that the current structure of constitutional
review of liberty and property interests is misguided because the Framers placed
property and liberty on equal footing.42 The historical case for strong individual
a taking."), with Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 431-32 (1919) (citations omitted)
("The right of a manufacturer to maintain secrecy as to his compounds and processes must be held
subject to the right of the state, in the exercise of its police power and in promotion of fair dealing,
to require that the nature of the product be fairly set forth.").
39. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
40. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment
is violated when land-use regulation '... denies an owner economically viable use of his land."'
(quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980))).
41. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) ("If the validity of the
legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be
allowed to control." (citing Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294 (1924))). Courts strongly
presume constitutionality when determining whether (1) a regulation amounts to a taking, and (2) a
taking promotes a public use. See supra note 36. However, courts apply a form of intermediate
scrutiny in cases where the government seeks to take property as a quid pro quo for permitting a
development project violating local zoning ordinances. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,
391 (1994) (requiring the government to show a reasonable nexus and a rough proportionality
between the exaction and the harm imposed on the community by a development project to avoid
paying compensation).
During the Lochner era, the Supreme Court applied something like strict scrutiny to
legislation affecting commercial economic interests. The scrutiny applied was strict in that the
Court held a number of statutes unconstitutional, but some have argued that during this era the
Court may have been seeking to divide private and governmental functions rather than assess the
need for the statute and the means of achieving that need. See Fallon, supra note 35, at 1285-86.
Compare Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550, 554 (1935) (holding that a state statute
imposing a progressive gross sales tax violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause), with Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 17 (1992) (upholding a property tax regime
imposing dramatically different tax liabilities on properties of equal value), and Allied Stores of
Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-28 (1958) (citations omitted) (holding that states have
wide flexibility in devising taxing regimes and must meet only the rational basis test).
42. Prior to the close of the Lochner era, the argument goes, landowners-and probably
property owners of all sorts-could use their property as they wished so long as they avoided
harming others in ways long recognized by the common law as nuisances. ELY, supra note 2, at 9
("[G]iven the framers' concern with protecting property as well as the nearly 150 years of Supreme
Court activity in this field, the relegation of property rights to a lesser constitutional status is not
historically warranted."); Lynton K. Caldwell, Rights of Ownership or Rights of Use?-The need
for a New Conceptual Basis for Land Use Policy, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 759, 761-64 (1974);
Epstein, Liberty Versus Property?, supra note 12, at 16; Norman Karlin, Back to the Future: From
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property rights supposedly arises from the intellectual history of the Founding
Era, the language of the Constitution itself, the case law interpreting it, and the
social understandings of American society. 43 To date, these efforts have failed.
Examining the intellectual history of the Founding Era paints an ambiguous
picture, and-perhaps more surprisingly-virtually nothing in the Constitution
itself, the case law interpreting it, or the surrounding social history convincingly
supports a claim that the judiciary closely scrutinized property rights at any time
in American history.
45
A. Intellectual History of the Founding Era
Commentators, noting the influence of John Locke's philosophy, argue that
the Framers viewed property and liberty with equal reverence. Excerpts of
Locke's writing do support the view that property and liberty form a unified
concept and thus, one might contend, should receive similar judicial scrutiny. In
his essay, Of Civil Government, Locke wrote that "[t]he right to enjoy property
without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to
travel, is in truth, a 'personal' right .... [A] fundamental interdependence exists
between the personal right to liberty and the personal right [to] property.
Neither could have meaning without the other."47 The Court has quoted this
Nollan to Lochner, 17 Sw. U. L. REV. 627, 637-38 (1988); Roger Pilon, Freedom, Responsibility,
and the Constitution: On Recovering Our Founding Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 507, 543
(1993).
43. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 3, at 25-26 (noting the practice of using social history to
interpret the Constitution).
44. Id. (discounting an historical interpretation of the Takings Clause because such an inquiry
will likely lead to "more confusion than it eliminates"); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police
Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 58 (1964).
45. One aspect of constitutional interpretation might support the view that courts should treat
property rights equivalently with liberty rights. The Takings Clause was the first of the individual
rights in the first eight Amendments to be applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4 (1964) (citing Chi., Burlington
& Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897)). Neither the incorporation
debate nor those seeking greater protection of property rights have accorded this fact any
significance, and there seems to be no particular reason why they should.
46. ELY, supra note, 2, at 28-29; Epstein, Liberty Versus Property?, supra note 12, at 1
("There is little doubt that this formulation of the matter has exerted profound influence over the
structure of American thought and constitutionalisrn"); Adam Mossoff, Locke's Labor Lost, 9 U.
CII. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 155, 155 (2002) ("A mere listing of the primary and secondary
sources-from the Founding Fathers to today-that explicitly refer to Locke or implicitly invoke
his ideas would rival the Encyclopedia Britannica in length. His labor argument for property, in
particular, has been especially influential.").
47. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (citing JOHN LOCKE, OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT, TWO TREATISES 82-85 (Ernest Rhys ed., J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1924) (1690);
John Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, in
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proposition to support the decision to extend federal jurisdiction equally to
liberty and property claims48 but has not used it to justify scrutinizing the two
types of claims equally.
Property rights adherents tend to ignore that Locke was tailoring this
absolutist language to bodily integrity, including the goods necessary for self-
preservation, two forms of property that he held to be unalienable. 49 One could
neither dispose of oneself-suicide was impermissible 50  or sell oneself into
slavery. 51 By contrast, the Framers, 52 like modern lawyers, saw property as
rights over alienable things.
53
Locke, of course, was not entirely silent with respect to state regulation of
modern forms of property. On that count, Locke can be read to support both
government regulation generally and redistribution of wealth specifically as
necessary to ensure that basic needs were met. With respect to government
regulation, Locke acknowledged that "in Governments the Laws regulate the
right of property, and the possession of land is determined by positive
constitutions."54 Although Locke does not address the extent of regulation in
great detail, he seemingly accepts the power of legislatures operating with the
consent of the people to shape "the nature and extent of property" so long as the
legislatures do not radically undermine the core right of exclusive possession.
55
DEMOCRACY, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY 121-32 (Francis W. Coker ed., 1942); WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *138-40).
48. See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 446 (1991); Lynch, 405 U.S. at 552.
49. STEPHEN BUCKLE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY: GROTIUS TO HUME,
168, 180 (1991). Even philosophers can fall victim to this interpretive error. Cf. id. at 179-80 ("It
is not uncommon for modem philosophers, concerned with the contemporary political question of
the justifiability of modem systems of private property, to begin their enquiries by examining
'traditional' arguments for property .... Approaches to Locke's theory from this sort of
perspective commonly go astray .... It is a mistake to assume, then, that Locke's arguments for
property are arguments for that cluster of rights which many modem philosophers regard as
constituting property.").
50. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 271 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1690) ("Every one... is bound to preserve himself .. "); see BUCKLE, supra note
49, at 170 (citation omitted).
51. BUCKLE, supra note 49, at 168.
52. NEDELSKY, supra note 22, at 23 ("Madison did not use the term property to stand for all
individual rights (as in the Lockean sense of life, liberty and estate) .... ").
53. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945) (describing property
rights to include the "right to possess, use and dispose"); LAWRENCE BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS:
PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 19 (1977) (describing property rights to include the rights to
"consume, waste, modify, or destroy" (citing A.M. Honor6, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 107, 118 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961))); EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 59 (stating the
same).
54. LOCKE, supra note 50, at 302.
55. BUCKLE, supra note 49, at 189-90 ("[I]n... stable, developed societies, property
becomes whatever the law makes of it .... [T]he precise character and extent of the rights
encompassed in property become a matter of (tacit) general agreement, entrenched in legal
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For example, the right to destroy even those things that modern lawyers wouldS ,56
understand to be property was limited to situations "where need requires.
With respect to redistribution, Stephen Buckle explains, "Locke does not
ignore the plight of those in serious need .... [H]e directly invokes the right of
charity all men can legitimately claim against one another .... 57 Locke
maintained that, "Charity gives every Man a Title to so much out of another's
Plenty, as will keep him from extream want, where he has no means to subsist
otherwise .... 58 Importantly, Locke uses "charity" to convey an enforceable
power to call on government to enforce a right to life's basic needs, not mere
voluntary "humane benevolence."
59
Further, Locke's philosophy cannot simply be mapped onto the Framers.
Though he certainly had influence, the Framers' views were multidimensional..... 60
Civic republicanism stood side by side with individualism As Frank
Michelman has explained, the Constitution is thus both "a liberal document"
rules.... Property arises naturally through the self-preserving activities of human beings, and the
more sophisticated notions of property that develop in civil society are a continuation of this
natural process, being adaptations to changed circumstances or refinements introduced for the
further improvement of human life.").
56. LOCKE, supra note 50, at 209; see BUCKLE, supra note 49, at 169 ("Locke... is
committed to rejecting the view that property is a right of absolute control over things."); id. at 181
("Wilful destruction is not within the purview of property right[s]; property does not bestow
absolute control over a thing.").
57. BUCKLE, supra note 49, at 159; see also id. at 161 ("Locke provides a safety net in the
form of the right of charity .... ).
58. LOCKE, supra note 50, at 170.
59. BUCKLE, supra note 49, at 159 (noting that Locke understood charity as "a Right to the
Surplusage of... Goods" and as something "that cannot justly be denyed" when a person is in
need (quoting LOCKE, supra note 50, at 170) (alteration in original)). Historical practice since
Locke's day has incorporated some form of public support for the poor:
The fundamental lesson of the history of public relief in the West is that the modem
welfare state, while an important innovation in scope, is not one in principle. One of the
most consistent elements in the history of Western political and legal thought and
practice has been the acceptance of a communal duty of public support for the destitute,
paid for out of taxation or its functional equivalent. Both Jewish and Christian traditions
proclaim a duty of support and a corresponding right to subsistence, to be implemented
not merely through the appeal to conscience but through law .... [T]he American
colonists brought with them [a system of poor relief], and it was firmly established in
the colonies at the time of independence.
Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 41 (1986).
60. Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1502 (1988); see ELY, supra note
2, at 48-49 (explaining that the Federalist Papers included both natural rights and economic
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and "a small 'r' republican document. ' 61 Because of these dual views,
Michelman concluded:
[The] Constitution is not reducible to one unified coherent set of
principles, but.., instead it's at war with itself in the deepest possible
way. The incoherence that you see in the takings decisions, among
others, is a reflection of a conflict that was built into the Constitution,
that was in the heads of the people who created it, and that remains
with the people who construe it.
62
Jennifer Nedelsky's research supports Michelman's belief that the Framers
had a quite nuanced understanding of property,63 and Carol Rose has
emphasized that the Framers saw property rights as critical to building a strong
society, as much a foreign policy objective as an individual rights concern.
In the end, one who points to John Adams, who wrote, "Property must be
secured or liberty cannot exist,"'65 must also take account of Benjamin Franklin,
who wrote that, "Private Property ... is a Creature of Society, and is subject to
the Calls of that Society, whenever its Necessities shall require it, even to its last
Farthing .... 66 What we know of the Framers' thinking, and probably all that
we could ever know about it, cannot settle this debate.
61. Proceedings, supra note 15, at 60 (statement of Frank Michelman); see NEDELSKY, supra
note 22, at 170-71.
62. Proceedings, supra note 15, at 60 (statement of Frank Michelman).
63. NEDELSKY, supra note 22, at 12 (discussing the views of different influential Framers
with respect to property); id. at 30 (acknowledging that the Framers recognized that some
regulation of property was necessary).
64. Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Takings
Jurisprudence-An Evolutionary Approach, 57 TENN. L. REV. 577, 582-83 (1990).
65. JOHN ADAMS, DISCOURSES ON DAVILA (1790), reprinted in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS 223, 280 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851). Compare JAMES MADISON, Property, NAT'L
GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266, 266 (Robert A.
Rutland et al. eds., 1983) (stating that land, merchandise, and money are property, but noting that
"[i]n its larger and juster meaning" the term also includes "every thing to which a man may attach
a value and have a right," including opinions, religious beliefs, and personal safety), with JAMES
MADISON, Parties, NAT'L GAZETTE, Jan. 23, 1792, reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 86, 86 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906) ("[T]he silent operation of laws, which, without
violating the rights of property, reduce extreme wealth towards a state of mediocrity .... ).
66. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, Queries and Remarks Respecting Alterations in the Constitution of
Pennsylvania, FED. GAZETTE, Nov. 3, 1789, reprinted in 10 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN 54, 59 (Albert Henry Smyth ed., 1907); see GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 62 (1969) ("'All property... is safe under [the people's]
protection."') (quoting THOMAS PAINE, The Forrester's Letter IV (May 8, 1776), in THOMAS
PAINE: COLLECTED WRITINGS 85, 89 (Eric Foner ed., 1995)); NEDELSKY, supra note 22, at 33
(echoing Franklin's point that property serves society's interests) (citing Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 385, 386-87
(Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973)). Early state governments incorporated this notion of property
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B. Constitutional Text
The conflicted intellectual history of the Founding Era does not trouble
many supporters of strong property rights, including those predating the modern
property rights movement, because they find the Framers' intent self-evident in
the wording of the Constitution. In his 1958 Holmes Lectures, for example,
Learned Hand declared that "there is no constitutional basis for asserting a
larger measure of judicial supervision over" liberty than property. A quarter
century later, Raoul Berger responded with consternation to the suggestion that
liberty and property should be treated differently: "But liberty and property are
on a par in the Due Process Clauses; the Clauses make no distinction
whatsoever between them.' 68 And in the 2008 edition of his book, The
Guardian of Every Other Right, James Ely contends that "[t]he Constitution
does not divide rights into categories."
69
In recent years, a new form of constitutional interpretation has emerged.
Known as semantic originalism,70 it contends that modern courts should
interpret the Constitution consistently with its public meaning at the time it was
ratified, rather than according to the intent of the Framers or the manner in
which they anticipated that courts would apply the document. 71 Adherents to
this theory have not positioned themselves as part of the property rights
movement; instead, they focus more broadly on articulating an overarching
theory of constitutional interpretation. A key player in the semantic originalism
movement, Randy Barnett, however, has articulated a theory of judicial
into their institutions and actions. For example, the Vermont Constitution required that "[p]rivate
property ought to be subservient to public uses, when necessity requires it," and regulations
allowed hunting on unenclosed land. ELY, supra note 2, at 33 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The government also confiscated loyalist property after the Revolutionary War without paying
compensation. Id. at 34-37, 41.
67. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 51 (Atheneum 1964) (1958).
68. Raoul Berger, Liberty and the Constitution, 29 GA. L. REV. 585, 593 (1995).
69. ELY, supra note 2, at 141.
70. Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 3 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law, Ill. Pub. Law
Research Paper No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244 ("The central
claim of Semantic Originalism is that constitutional law includes rules with content that are fixed
by the original public meaning of the text-the conventional semantic meaning of the words and
phrases in context.").
71. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 92 (2004)
(discussing original intent originalism versus original meaning originalism); Randy E. Barnett, An
Originalismfor Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REv. 611 (1999) (discussing how originalism prevails
as an approach to constitutional interpretation); Solum, supra note 70, at 3-11 (explaining four
theses that elaborate on the central meaning of semantic originalism); Keith E. Whittington, The
New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599, 609 (2004) ("[T]he new originalism is focused
less on the concrete intentions of individual drafters of constitutional text than on the public
meaning of the text that was adopted.").
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interpretation that he calls "The Presumption of Liberty." 72 This approach is
consistent with the property rights movement in its calling for equal scrutiny of
property and liberty claims, though it may differ in proposing an overarching
scheme of means-ends review rather than extending strict scrutiny to property
claims.
Whether one focuses on intent, anticipated applications, or public meaning,
each theory faces an uphill battle. If the text of the property clauses was the only
guide, one might conclude that property is less important than life and liberty
because it comes last in a nonalphabetical list, and the clauses require
compensation only when property is literally taken from its owner.
73
The commentators who claim to find parity between rights must therefore
mean that the Constitution as a whole, rather than the text of the individual
property clauses, requires equal treatment of liberty and property claims.
74
Expanding the inquiry, however, only weakens the case for parity. The
preamble extols "the Blessings of Liberty" with no mention of property.
75
Article I grants Congress thepower to take property in the form of taxes with no
compensation requirement, and the Sixteenth Amendment eliminated that
Article's original limitation that required proportionality based on population.
77
72. BARNETT, supra note 71, at 259-60 ("[T]he Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause can be viewed as establishing a general Presumption of Liberty, which places
the burden on the government to establish the necessity and propriety of any infringement on
individual freedon").
73. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person.., be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation."); id. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ).
74. Broadening our basis of inquiry from the text to the intent of the Framers, one might note
that property is also the latecomer to the party. The Declaration of Independence had previously
referred to life and liberty along with the pursuit of happiness, a decidedly different concept from
property. See generally Linda M. Keller, The American Rejection of Economic Rights as Human
Rights & the Declaration of Independence: Does the Pursuit of Happiness Require Basic
Economic Rights?, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 557, 564-85 (2003) (exploring the American
commitment to non-property economic rights as exemplified by the Declaration's reference to the
4pursuit of happiness" rather than "property"). Property rights advocates claim that the
Declaration's drafters understood the phrase "pursuit of happiness" to include government
protection of property acquisition. ELY, supra note 2, at 28-29.
75. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.4, amended by U.S. CONST. amend XVI ("No Capitation, or
other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before
directed to be taken."). A tax is literally a taking of property, although government benefits could
provide just compensation. Auditor of Lucas County v. State ex rel. Boyles, 78 N.E. 955, 956
(Ohio 1906) (holding that taxes other than for the common good constitute a taking); EPSTEIN,
supra note 3, at 315-16.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and
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Even the Bill of Rights itself, although generally understood as a limit on
government power vis-ii-vis the individual, in fact sanctions, if not creates,
significant government powers over property. The Takings Clause presupposes
the government's right to force the sale of private property.78 And the Court has
long understood the required 'just compensation" as a fair market value
standard, 79 which excludes, in Justice Frankfurter's words, "loss to the owner of
nontransferable values deriving from his unique need for property or
idiosyncratic attachment to it." Historians have not presented compelling
evidence that this clause was understood differently either at the time of the
initial ratification or in the 1860s when the Fourteenth Amendment extended the
Constitution's liberty and property protections to the states.
The Third and Fourth Amendments also permit the government to exploit
private property in the form of the compulsory quartering of soldiers during
wartime when prescribed by law
81 and in the form of reasonable searches.
Although our general concept of property includes a right to exclude trespassers
intent on spending the night at one's home or searching or seizing one's private
things, the Constitution permits the government to transgress those interests in
appropriate circumstances. In sum, the Constitution fairly read accepts
government power to invade property interests, including the most important
ones, in order to serve the public interest. By contrast, the Constitution
generally protects liberty rights more categorically. 83
without regard to any census or enumeration."); ELY, supra note 2, at 118 ("[T]he Sixteenth
Amendment opened the door for tax policies designed to redistribute wealth.").
78. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."); see also Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (citation omitted) ("The Clause operates as a
conditional limitation, permitting the government to do what it wants so long as it pays the charge.
The Clause presupposes what the government intends to do is otherwise constitutional .... ).
79. E.g., United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984) ("[J]ust compensation
normally is to be measured by 'the market value of the property at the time of the taking
contemporaneously paid in money."' (quoting Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934))).
80. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949); see Epstein, Author's
Retrospective, supra note 12, at 409.
An owner of noninvestment property that the government takes will typically have an
idiosyncratic attachment to it. Were that not so, a property owner would voluntarily sell to the
government, avoiding the expense and delay of eminent domain proceedings. In some cases,
property owners may desire to sell but hold out for an offer above fair market value. In such cases,
fair market value may in some sense constitute full compensation. But surely many exercises of
eminent domain do not involve hold outs.
81. U.S. CONST. amend. III ("No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.").
82. Id. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... ).
83. The Bill of Rights states the rights of free speech, assembly, and religion, id. amend. I;
the rights of the accused, id. amends. V-VI; and the rights of those convicted of crimes, id. amend
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C. Judicial Interpretation
One might argue that judicial interpretation of the Constitution
demonstrates a reverence for property that is not apparent from the text alone.
During no period in our history, however, has the Court strictly scrutinized
property claims.84 To be sure, one can find statements of black letter law to the
effect that individuals had the exclusive right to use and dispose of their
property.85 But the understanding that these rights were subject to "the limits
prescribed by the terms of his right tempered these statements."86 The Supreme
Court cases of every historical era have recognized broad legislative authority to
define these terms to serve the public interest. 87
VIII, in categorical terms. To be sure, the Constitution permits reasonable seizures of the person,
but it is unclear how a law enforcement system could operate otherwise. As relating to liberty,
then, the Fourth Amendment seems as limited as possible given the government's duty to enforce
the criminal law.
A key element of semantic originalism is the distinction between constitutional
interpretation, which involves uncovering the original public meaning of the words of the
document, and constitutional construction, which involves answering constitutional questions by
applying the full array of legal and policy devices to reach a decision that does not conflict with the
original public meaning. BARNETT, supra note 71, at 128; see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 1 (1999); KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 5 & 211 n.3 (1999) (citing FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL
HERMENEUTICS 17 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., Hein & Co. 1970) (1839)). See
generally Solum, supra note 70, at 20, 69-89 (exploring the distinction between interpretation and
construction and explaining how the distinction "expresses an important insight of New
Originalism"). Barnett relies largely on construction, albeit limited by his understanding of the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, to support his view that the police power, on
which states generally base property regulation, is narrower than many courts have thought.
BARNETT, supra note 71, at 328. A strict fidelity to the constitutional text thus does not dictate
Barnett's general "Presumption of Liberty" or its particular application to property rights claims. In
this sense, he relies on neither historical imperative nor an inevitable progression from modem
jurisprudence to support his argument for equal scrutiny of all constitutional claims. His theory
thus falls outside the scope of the critique presented in this Article.
84. Eric Claeys has argued that the state courts in the nineteenth century articulated a strong,
natural rights account of property. Claeys, Natural Property Rights, supra note 12, at 1574-77.
This account permitted a good deal of government regulation, however, and would have been an
unlikely forbearer of the modem property rights movement. See generally id. at 1569 ("Every
individual has as much freedom in the acquisition, use, and disposition of his property, as is
consistent with good order, and the reciprocal rights of others." (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 328 (2d
ed., 1832))).
85. STEPHEN MARTIN LEAKE, AN ELEMENTARY DIGEST OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN LAND
2 (1874) ("Rights to things, jura in rem, have for their subject some material thing, as land or
goods, which the owner may use or dispose of in any manner he pleases within the limits
prescribed by the terms of his right.").
86. Id.
87. See Christopher W. Smart, Legislative and Judicial Reactions to Kelo: Eminent Domain's
Continuing Role in Redevelopment, PROB. & PROP., Mar.-Apr. 2008, at 60, 60-61 (discussing
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1. Early Republic
Courts and commentators often cite the eighteenth century case Calder v.
Bull88 for its dicta asserting that no legislature would have the power to enact "a
law that takes property from A. and gives it to B."' 8 9 By contrast, the Court's
holding-that a resolution altering the standards for a valid will was not an
impermissible ex post facto law9-was actually quite deferential. Justice Chase
explained that "the right, as well as the mode, or manner, of acquiring property,
and of alienating or transferring, inheriting, or transmitting it, is conferred by
society; is regulated by civil institution, and is always subject to the rules
prescribed by positive law."
91
2. Early Nineteenth Century
In the antebellum period, the Court squarely rejected the notion that the
Constitution enshrined some version of natural property rights that no
legislature could alter. In Ogden v. Saunders,92 the Court rejected a challenge to
a state bankruptcy law on the ground that debt relief interfered with property
rights obtained through contractual agreement. 93 As Justice Trimble perhaps
most lucidly explained, "[I]n general, men derive the right of private
property... from the principles of natural, universal law... yet, it is equally
true, that these rights, and the obligations resulting from them, are subject to be
regulated, modified, and, sometimes, absolutely restrained, by the positive
enactions of municipal law." 94 A state's ability to abrogate existing property
interests was limited, but a state's power to define the scope of prospective
interests was much broader.
95
courts' recognition of the government's ability to take property under the power of eminent
domain "so long as the property so acquired would be open for general 'public use').
88. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
89. Id. at 388.
90. Id. at 394-95.
91. Id. at 394.
92. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
93. Id. at 313. The case had no majority opinion. Id. at 332 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). The
Court had previously declared a bankruptcy law unconstitutional when applied to debts incurred
before passage of the law. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 131-32 (1819).
94. Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 319-20 (Trimble, J.).
95. See id. at 322-23 (Trimble, J.); id. at 292 (Johnson, J.) (explaining that government power
to alter property rights exists despite the risk that the government may misuse the power); see also
W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 533 (1848) ("[T]he power in question...
remains with the States to the full extent in which it inheres in every sovereign government, to be
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3. Late Nineteenth Century
In the post-Civil War period, the Legal Tender Cases9 6 reiterated the same
deferential tone toward legislative regulation of property rights. Congress had
declared treasury notes valid tender for certain debts, leaving creditors who had
been entitled to gold or silver worse off than before the law took effect.97 The
plaintiffs argued that this government action violated the spirit of the property
clauses by reducing the value of their property without due process or just
compensation.9 8 The Court rejected the claim, explaining that the clauses had
"always been understood as referring only to a direct appropriation, and not to
consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power. It has never
been supposed to have any bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work• • • "99
harm and loss to individuals. Although the Court recognized that many
government actions-tariffs, embargoes, wars-affect private property interests
in significant ways, the Constitution does not restrict legislative action or
compel compensation. 100
In Kelly v. Pittsburgh,10 1 the Court held that a state or municipality has the
authority to directly appropriate property in the form of taxes that do not
proportionally benefit the payor.102 The Court explained:
It probably is true.., that [the plaintiffs] tax bears a very unjust
relation to the benefits received .... But who can adjust with precise
accuracy the amount which each individual in an organized civil
community shall contribute to sustain it, or can insure in this respect
96. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870), abrogated by Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-
15 (1922).
97. See id. at 463. Some state courts did, controversially, recognize a broader right to
compensation. See, e.g., McCombs v. Town Council of Akron, 15 Ohio 474, 480 (1846) (holding
that municipal corporations could be liable for consequential injuries caused by non-negligent acts
authorized by the legislature).
98. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 551.
99. Id.; see United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 465 (1903) ("All private property is held
subject to the necessities of government. The right of eminent domain underlies all such rights of
property. The government may take personal or real property whenever its necessities, or the
exigencies of the occasion, demand."), overruled in part by United States v. Chi., M., St. P. & P.R.
Co., 312 U.S. 592, 598 (1941), modified on reh'g, 313 U.S. 543 (1941). At least one state court
prohibited explicit redistributive legislation beyond aid to the destitute. See State ex rel. Griffith v.
Osawkee Twp., 14 Kan. 322, 329-30 (1875) (citing Lowell v. City of Boston, 111 Mass. 454, 473
(1873)), overruled in part by Beck v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Shawnee County, 182 P. 397, 402 (Kan.
1919).
100. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 550-51.
101. 104 U.S. 78 (1881).
102. Id. at 82-83.
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absolute equality of burdens, and fairness in their distribution among
those who must bear them?
10 3
4. Twentieth Century
In the twentieth century, the Court placed some limit on the direct effect of
government regulation, requiring compensation when the regulation "goes too
far." 10 At nearly the same time, however, the Court rejected takings challenges
to zoning and rent control legislation, making clear that a regulation must go
very far indeed before compensation is required. 105 And when paying
compensation, there is virtually nothing that the government cannot do so long
as it pursues the public interest either with respect to taking property and paying
compensation or taxing property without paying compensation.
103. Id. at 82. In a subsequent case, the Court explained that all public officials "are bound in
morals and in law to exercise an honest judgment as to all matters submitted for their official
determination. It is not to be presumed that they will act otherwise than according to this rule."
Spring Valley Water-Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347, 354 (1884). Altering rights with an impact
on property value, the Court recognized, is a power that "bad men may abuse," but when the
legislature acts within its powers, the courts are powerless to interfere. Id. at 355.
104. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Prior to Mahon, the Court applied
the Takings Clause only to explicit appropriations of property and the physical equivalent, such as
government action that floods private property. See, e.g., Lynah, 188 U.S. at 470 ("[W]here the
government by the construction of a dam or other public works so floods lands belonging to an
individual as to substantially destroy their value there is a taking within the scope of the 5th
Amendment.").
105. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (upholding zoning
regulation with the effect of reducing property values by 75%); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 158
(1921) (citing Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 569) (upholding rent
control legislation).
106. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005).
107. City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369, 374 (1974) ("[T]he due process
of law clause contained in the Fifth Amendment is not a limitation upon the taxing power
conferred upon Congress .... (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting A. Magnano Co. v.
Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44 (1934))); see United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 63 (1989)
(citing Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 462 (1978)) (rejecting a Takings Clause
challenge to the imposition of a user fee on persons litigating before the Iran Claims Tribunal);
MARK KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE?: THE CHOICE BETWEEN REGULATION AND TAXATION
61 (1999) ("Courts have upheld all sorts of classifications that tax persons differently depending on
factors distinct from their wealth, income, spending, or ownership of equally valuable resources.").
But see id. at 61-62 (explaining constitutional limits on levying taxes based on "ascriptive status"
such as race or gender, the out of state origin of the taxpayer, or arbitrary distinctions with no basis
in state law or that unduly burden some other constitutional right such as free speech).
Even discrimination among potential taxpayers is generally permissible so long as "any state
of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it." Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers,
358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959) (citing four of its prior cases stating the rule). For example, the Court
upheld California's Proposition 13, which mandated that the government reassess property for tax
[VOL. 60:1
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During this period, courts came to interpret provisions of the Constitution
affecting liberty more strictly than claims relating to property. Cases raising
First Amendment claims are entitled to strict scrutiny,108 and the Court carefully
scrutinizes liberty-protecting rights of criminal defendants.109 Jury trials,
explicitly required in criminal cases where liberty is at stake, 110 are not
constitutionally required against government intrusion on property interests in
eminent domain cases.111
One might argue that the probing scrutiny of search and seizure claims that
emerged in the mid-twentieth century112 tacitly supports similar scrutiny of
claims under the property clauses. Searches and property seizures, after all,
impact property interests, and the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard
may be viewed as analogous to the property clauses, which presumably permit
reasonable regulation of property.
Although the Court has never specifically addressed why it reviews Fourth
Amendment claims more strictly than property claims, a careful analysis of the
two situations reveals clear grounds for the distinction. Police and land use
planners are situated quite differently with respect to their governmental
status. 113 The police engage "in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime,"'114 which creates substantial institutional pressure to tread on individual
purposes only upon sale resulting in dramatically different tax bills for properties of equivalent
value. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 4, 18 (1992).
108. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1988) ("[A] content-based restriction on
political speech in a publicforum ... must be subject to the most exacting scrutiny.").
109. The Court has long required the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege" for waivers. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), overruled in panl by
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981).
110. Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 334-35 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
111. There is no constitutional right to a jury trial in eminent domain proceedings under the
federal Constitution and most state constitutions. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 738 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("[C]ondemnation proceedings carried 'no uniform and established right to a common law jury
trial... [when] the Seventh Amendment was adopted."' (quoting 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.32[1] (2d ed. 1996))); United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14,
18 (1970); Dep't of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Kirkendall, 112 N.E.2d 611, 614 (111. 1953); Cobb v.
S.C. Dep't of Transp., 365 S.C. 360, 364-65, 618 S.E.2d 299, 301 (2005). Contra OHIO CONST.
art. I, § 19 (requiring trial by jury). See generally ELY, supra note 2, at 27 (noting that
parliamentary revisions to admiralty court procedures in the 1770s caused complaint in the
colonies because the admiralty courts functioned without a jury).
112. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-15 (1948) (requiring a warrant to support
the search of a home even if the police can later show the existence of probable cause).
113. See Steven Semeraro, Demystifying Antitrust State Action Doctrine, 24 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 203, 214-16 (2000) (describing how government employees choose to accept duties to
serve the public).
114. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14. The famous phrase is from Justice Jackson's opinion. Id. at 13-
14 ("The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not
that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from
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rights in order to fulfill a governmental duty of bringing the guilty to justice. In
contrast, a planning board is a politically accountable body that makes land use
decisions to benefit the public. The duty of the planner does not encompass an
incentive to trample individual property rights in the same way that the duty of a
police officer does. 115
The Court has recognized the importance of this distinction in role when
considering how the Constitution limits the conduct of parole officers. 116 Unlike
police officers, but like land use planners, a parole officer does not bear
"hostility... that destroys his neutrality" when dealing with a parolee. 117 As the
Court explained, "realistically the failure of the parolee is in a sense a failure for
his supervising officer."' 118 As a result, courts grant parole officers more
constitutional leeway than police.
The relationship between planners and property owners in the community is
closer to that of parole officers and parolees than to that of police and suspects.
Just as the parole officer's role is to assist the parolee, and the parolee's success
translates to the success of the parole officer, the planner's role is to improve
the community, and the planner's success depends upon the satisfaction of
property owners in the community.
A state magistrate deciding whether to issue a warrant, rather than a
policeman on the beat, is a more appropriate governmental figure with whom to
compare a planner. 119 Both types of officials assume neutral positions toward
the individuals that their decisions will affect. Magistrates are not responsible
evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime."). The Court has of course expressed this sentiment many times
both before, see, e.g., United States v. Letkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) ("[T]he informed and
deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants as to what searches and
seizures are permissible under the Constitution are to be preferred over the hurried action of
officers and others who may happen to make arrests. Security against unlawful searches is more
likely to be attained by resort to search warrants than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of
petty officers while acting under the excitement that attends the capture of persons accused of
crime." (citing Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931); United States v.
Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926))), and after, see, e.g., Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v.
Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 368 (1998) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984)) (using
Johnson's phrase).
115. Cf. Scott, 524 U.S. at 368 (holding that a parole officer is distinguishable from a police
officer because the parole system is "more supervisory than adversarial" (citing Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 879 (1987))).
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,485-86 (1972)).
118. Id.
119. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 338
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for catching criminals and thus have a duty to remain neutral in considering
warrant applications. Similarly, planners have a duty to balance the property
interests of all constituents when making land use decisions. Because federal
courts grant considerable deference to magistrates issuing search warrants,
120
similar treatment for planners is appropriate. 121
5. Conclusion
This brief-like rejection of strong property rights is not intended to be a
definitive statement of constitutional history. Surely, one can locate Supreme
Court language expressing greater reverence for property rights in particular
circumstances than the examples given here. The point is that the case law
history does not definitively favor strong property rights in any era to such an
extent as to justify dramatically changing modern jurisprudence.
D. Social History and Symbols
Commentators seeking to justify strong property rights might argue that
irrespective of the written opinions of judges in property cases, the American
citizenry has always had great reverence for property in its collective heart. And
this reverence would justify strong property rights, even if some courts in the
past have failed to recognize it.
Justice Scalia, in his opinion for the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council,122 claimed to find support for strengthening property rights in
what he called an "historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has
become part of our constitutional culture." 123 As Justice Scalia readily admitted,
neither legal practice during the Colonial Era nor the language of the Takings
120. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) ("A magistrate's 'determination of probable
cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts."' (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393
U.S. 410, 419 (1969), abrogated by Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39 (1983))). The good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule effectively grants total deference to a magistrate's probable cause
determination unless (1) the magistrate is not neutral and detached; or (2) the police officer was
dishonest or completely unreasonable in seeking the warrant. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
922-23 (1984) (citing Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1979); Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72 (1978); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975)),
superseded by FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (e).
121. In some ways, a planning board might be entitled to even greater deference than an
elected magistrate who is subject to electoral pressure that weighs against the individual liberty of
criminal defendants. By contrast, electoral pressure on planners likely weighs in favor of property
owners.
122. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
123. Id. at 1028.
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• • •124
Clause is in accord with the compact. He recognized, however, that a cultural• • 125
history may develop outside the formal legal one. One looking for such a
history of strong property rights might look to social movements and symbols as
evidence of societal attitudes not reflected in the law. An early, successful
popular movement led to the inclusion of the Bill of Rights, including the
property clauses, in the Constitution. 126 But a desire to safeguard property
interests did not animate the popular call for amendments protecting individual
rights. 127 Federal control over state government and individual liberty were the
driving issues. 128
James Madison, who had originally opposed the Bill of Rights, authored the
property clauses, 129 and his proposed preamble, which explicitly recognized that
the amendments protected "the right of acquiring and using property" along
with the "enjoyment of life and liberty," was never ratified. Although subject
to varying possible interpretations, the social history leading to the Bill of
Rights provides little support for a grassroots property rights movement.
The longstanding association between Americans and land ownership also
fails to fill the bill. Opportunities to own land were surely important to colonial
Americans, 131 who no doubt believed that government power to take private
124. Id. at 1028 n.15 (recognizing that colonial America did not follow the rule proposed and
that the language of the Takings Clause did not compel it). Justice Scalia seems to share the view
of some commentators that the Framers' failure to foresee future land use regulation does not mean
that they would not have required compensation. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, History Lean: The
Reconciliation of Private Property and Representative Government, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 595-
96 (1995) (arguing that while Blackstone may not have foreseen taking by regulation, his views on
protecting private property from government confiscation apply equally to regulation).
125. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28.
126. See ELY, supra note 2, at 52 ("The most compelling objection to ratification concerned
the lack of a bill of rights.").
127. William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 708 (1985) ("While at least two
states had requested every other provision contained in the ratified Bill of Rights, none had sought
the imposition of a just compensation requirement. In fact, to the extent that the compensation
issue entered the ratification debate at all, the concern was on the other side: Some opponents of
the Constitution expressed their fear that federal courts would make the states pay individual
claims." (citing EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 161-63
tbl.1 (1957)))
128. NEDELSKY, supra note 22, at 186-187.
129. Paul Finkelman, Intentionalism, the Founders, and Constitutional Interpretation, 75
Tx. L. REv. 435, 476 (1996) (book review) (describing Madison as a "reluctant father of the Bill
of Rights" because he was opposed to it); Treanor, supra note 127, at 708 (recognizing Madison as
the author of the property clauses of the Fifth Amendment).
130. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); ELY, supra note 2, at 54.
131. ELY, supra note 2, at 12.
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property should be circumscribed by law. 132 At the same time, popularly elected
colonial, revolutionary, and antebellum governments used eminent domain
extensively to foster economic growth 133 and often placed "economic growth
ahead of protecting the interests of landowners."
' 134
Recent research has revealed that social perspectives, as reflected by local
legislation, cut against an early "constitutional culture" favoring strong property
rights. John Hart's work has revealed an extensive array of colonial land use
regulation that in "its volume and variety, evidences a once-conventional
concept of private property according to which the right of landowners to
control and utilize their land remained subject to an obligation to further
important community objectives reflected in legislation."135 Barry Shain has
concluded that property ownership at the time of the framing was seen as "a
right of stewardship that the public entrusted to an individual, for both private
and public benefit."
' 136
During the period of ratification, the Framers rejected Madison's attempt to
impose a property qualification for electors to the Senate, 137 and popular
movements typically opposed early efforts to establish property ownership• 138
requirements for lower elected office. Moreover, states generally did not pay
132. Id. at 13 ("'[N]o mans goods or estate shall be taken away from him... unless it be by
the vertue or equity of some expresse law of the Country."' (quoting LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF
MASSACHUSETTS 1 (Harvard University Press 1929) (1648))).
133. Id. at 24-25 ("Existing property arrangements were compelled to yield to the colony's
social and economic needs.").
134. Id. at 77.
135. John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1257 (1996); see William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding
of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 807-08 (1995); see also
Leslie Bender, The Takings Clause: Principles or Politics?, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 735, 751 (1985)
(arguing that land use regulations were common in colonial America) (citing LAWRENCE
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 66-68 (1973)).
Hart concludes that this evidence is so powerful that, pursuant to an originalist understanding
of the Constitution, the Takings Clause should not limit regulation at all. Hart, supra, at 1292
("The evidence concerning the Framers' experience with land use regulation suggests that the
Takings Clause means what it says about land use regulation: nothing."); Sax, supra note 44
("[C]ontemporaneous commentary upon the meaning of the compensation clause is in very short
supply.... [Flew authorities which are available... [indicate] that the clause was designed to
prevent arbitrary government action,... [not to protect economic value].").
136. BARRY ALAN SHAIN, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM 183 (1994). This
interpretation is consistent with common law understandings of government power over property.
FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE 80-81 (1973) (quoting The Case of the King's
Prerogative in Saltpetre, (1606) 77 Eng. Rep. 1294 (K.B.)).
137. NEDELSKY, supra note 22, at 56-57, 303 n.5.
138. The struggle over whether to base political representation on the property tax base or the
population was usually decided in favor of the latter. WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE
REVOLUTIONARY ERA 162 (1980) ("Taxation only respects property, without regard to the
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compensation for regulation that reduced the value of land, though they usually,
but not always, did when they took property outright. 139
The nineteenth century brought no significant change. At the century's
turn, only two state constitutions, Vermont and Massachusetts, required the
government to compensate landowners when it lawfully took private property
for public use, and even as late as 1868, five of the original states still had no• • 141
compensation requirement. Legislation abrogating property rights to serve the
public interest regularly occurred, and the courts upheld it.
Even under federal law, when a constitutional mandate was in place, the
courts refused to compel compensation for anything less than the functional
equivalent of the government's literal taking of title to one's property. 143 And
although the Lochner Era constituted a judicial campaign to scrutinize
innovative economic programs strictly,1 44 that legislatures continued to enact
those programs cuts against a culture of strong property rights. 145
liberties of a person. ... ) (quoting THE PEOPLE THE BEST GOVERNORS, reprinted in 1
FREDERICK CHASE, A HISTORY OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE AND THE TOWN OF HANOVER NEW
HAMPSHIRE 657-58 (John K. Lord ed., 1891)).
139. ELY, supra note 2, at 77-78, 94 (quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69
(1887)).
140. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
63-65 (1977) ("[Into the nineteenth century] there continued to be a strong current in American
legal thought that regarded compensation simply as a 'bounty given.., by the State' out of
'kindness' and not out of justice." (quoting Commonwealth v. Fisher, 1 Pen. & W. 462, 465 (Pa.
1830))).
141. J.A.C. Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, in 2
SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 912, 915-916 (1938) (citing MASS. CONST. of
1780, art. X; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I § 2).
142. See, e.g., Fisher, 1 Pen. & W. at 465 ("What the government conceives is for the public
good, it may do; what that public good requires, it may claim .. "); M'Clenachan v. Curwin, 3
Yeates 362, 373 (Pa. 1802) ("[A]s to the land which lay in a state of nature, [individuals] were
bound to contribute as much [land], as by the laws of the country, were deemed necessary for the
public convenience."); State v. Dawson, 21 S.C.L. (3 Hill) 100, 103-04 (S.C. 1836) (recognizing
that the legislature has exercised the power to appropriate property for public use for 150 years).
143. During the antebellum period, "few questioned the authority of state governments to
regulate the use and enjoyment of private property. Antebellum jurists agreed that the interests of
the community prevailed over the claims of unfettered private dominion." ELY, supra note 2, at
60-61; see Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of
the Property-Privilege Distinction and "Takings" Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 3, 76
(1986).
144. See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 328-30 (1921) (striking down a state statute
permitting peaceful picketing of a business on the ground that it unconstitutionally interfered with
the business owner's property rights); ELY, supra note 2, at 107408 ([T]he majority of Supreme
Court justices remained leery of economic regulations that altered free-market ordering or
infringed on property rights."). The Lochner era, however, may have been a historic break with
earlier forms of constitutional review. Wolf, supra note 4, at 1241-42.
145. See generally Michael J. Phillips, How Many Times Was Lochner-Era Substantive Due
Process Effective?, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1049, 1050 (1997) (stating that the Supreme Court
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Drawing definitive conclusions about societal views from legislative policy
is an inexact science. Looking beyond official policy, a historian might find that
a society's symbols and mottos convey a social view supporting strong property
rights that is not otherwise apparent. In this vein, James Ely contends that "the
cry 'Liberty and Property' became the motto of the revolutionary
movement." 4 6
This early motto, however, appears to have had little traction. From early
on liberty, not property, has been the dominant symbol. The early Congress
chose to enshrine liberty in the design of its coinage, mandating that all coins
bear "an impression emblematic of liberty"; "an inscription of the word
Liberty"; and a depiction of an eagle. 147
Another early symbol emblematic of the ideals of the new nation was the
Liberty Bell. 148 In 1831, Samuel F. Smith penned America, popularly known as
My Country, 'tis of Thee, a multi stanza hymn to the United States that is
famous for the phrase "Sweet Land of Liberty" and refers to liberty two
additional times without mentioning property.14  In his Gettysburg Address,
Lincoln described the United States as "conceived in liberty"; he did not. 150
mention property. Later came the Statue of Liberty and the poem, The "New
Colossus," with which it became entwined:
reviewed state regulation of economic or property interests on constitutional grounds in over 200
cases during the Lochner era).
146. ELY, supra note 2, at 25.
147. Act of April 2, 1792, ch. 117, § 10, 1 Stat. 246. This practice is no relic of our early
history. The United States mint continues to inscribe Liberty on all its circulating coins. U.S. Mint,
Circulating Coins, http://www.usmint.gov/mint-programs/circulatingcoins/ (last visited Oct. 9,
2008) (follow hyperlink for each denomination to view). Since 1986, the country has minted
bullion coins for investors bearing the word Liberty as well as various symbols of liberty and an
eagle. The American Eagles Program of the United States Mint, http://www.usmint.gov/
mint-programs/american eagles/index.cfm?action=american eagle bullion (last visited Oct. 9,
2008).
148. Cast in the 1750s, the symbolic bell did not receive its current name until the 1830s
when it was associated with the abolitionist movement. The Liberty Bell-Setting the Stage,
http://www.nps.gov/history/nr/twhp/wwwlpsllessons/36liberty/36setting.htm (last visited Oct. 9,
2008). The bell itself includes the biblical inscription, "Proclaim liberty throughout all the land
unto all inhabitants thereof." The Liberty Bell, supra (quoting Leviticus 25:10). Over time, the bell
was adopted as a symbol for the women's rights and civil rights movements as well as the struggle
against all manner of political oppression. The Liberty Bell, supra. In the mid-twentieth century,
the U.S. Mint used it as the reverse of the half dollar coin. History of the Liberty Bell,
http://www.coincommunity.com/coin-histories/half-dollar_1948_franklin.asp (last visited Oct. 9,
2008).
149. The first stanza refers to the "Sweet Land of Liberty"; the fourth refers to God as the
"Author of Liberty"; and the sixth refers to the "Thy Safeguard, Liberty." Smith, supra note 1.




Semeraro: Sweet Land of Property?: The History, Symbols, Rhetoric, and Theo
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
"Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!" cries she,
With silent lips. "Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free .... 151
And, of course, the Pledge of Allegiance recognizes "liberty and justice," but
not property, "for all."
' 152
The notion of a property bell, hymn, or statue is simply incredible. Liberty,
not property, has always been and continues to be the emblem of America.
Property bears no similar special place. On the contrary, one of the few well
known references to private property in popular culture, Woody Guthrie's This
Land is Your Land, has a negative connotation:
Was a high wall there that tried to stop me
A sign was painted said: Private Property,
But on the back side it didn't say nothing-
That side was made for you and me
Taken together, the intellectual history, case law, and social history are
simply too ambiguous to support a claim that a regime of strong property rights
existed in law or in social understanding at any time in the nation's history. A
case for strong property rights must be derived from some other source.
IV. EXTENDING STRICT SCRUTINY TO PROPERTY CASES
Even if there is no compelling historical support for strong property rights,
a justification may emerge as the natural development of currently evolving
jurisprudential models. The strict scrutiny the Court applies to important liberty
151. Emma Lazarus, The "New Colossus," Nov. 2, 1883, http://www.nps.gov/archive/stli/
newcolossus/index.html.
152. RICHARD J. ELLIS, TO THE FLAG: THE UNLIKELY HISTORY OF THE PLEDGE OF
ALLEGIANCE 1 (2005). Of course, school children have recited the Pledge since the 1890s. Id. at
19. Interestingly, some authors believe it was drafted by a socialist who considered adding
equality, but not property, to the "liberty and justice" phrase. Id. at 28-29.
153. Woody Guthrie, This Land is Your Land, in HOWARD ZINN & ANTHONY ARMORE,
VOICES OF A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 353-54 (2004). Woody Guthrie's son,
Arlo, changed the lyrics of the private property verse of This Land is Your Land without changing
its relevance for this article. Arlo's version reads:
As I was walkin'-I saw a sign there
And that sign said-no tress passin'
But on the other side .... it didn't say nothin!
Now that side was made for you and me!
Lyrics to Arlo Guthrie's version of This Land is Your Land, http://www.arlo.net/resources/
lyrics/this-land.shtml (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
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claims has a relatively short pedigree. 154 One might thus argue that because the
Court uses heightened scrutiny for liberty claims despite scant historical
support, it should do the same for property claims. 155
A number of judges from across the political spectrum have advocated for
this approach, analogizingproperty rights to other constitutional rights that the• • • 156Y
Court strictly scrutinizes. This Part sets out three leading examples articulated
by Justice Brennan, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Judge Janice Rogers Brown,
then a justice of the California Supreme Court and now a judge on the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
This Part describes each judge's rhetoric and then shows that its
persuasiveness depends on the linguistic decision to use a single word-right-
to refer to the concepts of liberty and property, even though we understand the
two concepts to fulfill different social roles. As a result, when courts move
beyond the general rhetoric of rights and face concrete situations in which
liberty and property interests are at stake, the metaphor loses much of its
persuasiveness and courts nearly invariably privilege liberty interests over
property interests. 157
A. The Rhetoric of Parity in Judicial Opinions
This section sets out three leading examples in which judges have sought to
strengthen property rights by equating property with liberty.
1. Constitutional Knowledge
In 1981,158 the Supreme Court took up the issue of whether the government
must compensate property owners for temporary takings-situations in which a
court determines land use limitation to constitute a taking and the government
responds by repealing the regulation. 159 In a dissenting opinion that actually
154. Fallon, supra note 35.
155. Cf EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 115 ("If [Justice] Stone is correct [in footnote 4 of
Carolene Products], then a set of uniform standards should make it more likely that judicial
intervention will respond to the risks to discrete and insular minorities.").
156. Although the specific use of this rhetorical move appears to be of relatively recent
origin, jurists advanced and debated more general declarations that all constitutional rights should
receive equal treatment much earlier. Compare Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428
(1956) (Frankfurter, J.) ("As no constitutional guarantee enjoys preference, so none should suffer
subordination or deletion."), with id. at 439-40 (Reed, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (joining
opinion "except as to the statement that no constitutional guarantee enjoys preference.").
157. Cf Grey, supra note 59, at 47 ("[T]he history of both institutional practice and
speculative and casuistic thought in the West converges on the conclusion that where claims to life
and property collide, life must take precedence.").
158. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
159. Id. at 630.
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commanded a majority of the Court, 16 Justice Brennan argued that repealing a
regulation that had taken private property could not undo the constitutional161
harm. The government had to compensate the owner for loss suffered during
the time that the law was in effect. 162
In response to the argument that his proposed rule would overly inhibit land
use planners in performing their public function, Brennan analogized the
Takings Clause to constitutional rules governing the conduct of police officers:
"After all, if a policeman must know the Constitution, then why not a
planner?" 163 By posing this question, Brennan sought parity in the scrutiny of
liberty- and property-infringing claims.
2. Comparing Property Regulation to First and Fourth Amendment
Claims
In 1994,164 the Court considered whether the Constitution required a
municipality to compensate a developer when the government (1) exacts
property as a condition of permitting a development project and (2) that
exaction would constitute a taking were the government to demand it outside of
the permitting process. 165 The Court held that the government could escape
paying compensation only by showing a rough proportionality between the
160. Brennan wrote on behalf of four justices, and Justice Rehnquist, although concurring in
the majority opinion on procedural grounds, agreed with Justice Brennan's substantive analysis. Id.
at 636 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell); id. at 633-34
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (explaining that if he believed that the Court had jurisdiction, he
"would have little difficulty in agreeing with much of what is said" in Justice Brennan's dissent).
Six years later, the Court adopted Brennan's view. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1987).
161. Brennan's principal reasoning on the merits of the case was that, by definition, a
regulatory taking unfairly benefits the public at the expense of the burdened landowner. The point
of compensation is to ensure that the public shares in the expense required to produce the benefit.
Because the public benefits during the period that the regulation is in effect, its repeal, in and of
itself, does not balance accounts. The government must still pay compensation for the benefit the
public received during the period in which the regulation applied. San Diego Gas & Elec., 450
U.S. at 656-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 658.
163. Id. at 661 n.26. In subsequent years, lower courts and individual judges repeated
Brennan's rhetoric. See Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1409
(9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinsky, J.), overruled by Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1325-26 (9th
Cir. 1996); Santini v. Conn. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 739 A.2d 680, 696 n.9 (Conn. 1999)
(McDonald, J., dissenting); Palmer v. City of Ojai, 223 Cal. Rptr. 542, 550 (1986), superseded by
statute, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65,965 (West. Supp. 2008).
164. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
165. Id. at 386.
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exaction-the government's demand-and the burdens imposed on the
community as a result of the project. 
166
In an opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist supported this holding
by comparing the property clauses to the First and Fourth Amendments.
Rehnquist reasoned that because the Court carefully scrutinized business
regulations affecting speech and privacy, it should similarly scrutinize
regulations that affect property value: "We see no reason why the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First
Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor• ,,168
relation in these comparable circumstances. Like Brennan, Rehnquist
recognized the appeal of balanced treatment for two concepts that both have the
status of constitutional rights.
3. Rent Control as a Taking
In a 1999 case challenging a Santa Monica rent control ordinance, 169 the
California Supreme Court held that no taking occurred because price controls
are within the government's police power.
170 Justice Brown dissented. 171
Expanding on Justice Rehnquist's evocative poor relation metaphor, she argued
that "[n]othing in the text or structure of either [the Takings or Due Process
Clauses] suggests an infringement of a property interest ought to be accorded
166. Id. at 391.
167. Id. at 392 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 570 (1980); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978)).
168. Id. Rehnquist's rhetoric may have been a reaction to Carol Rose's description of United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), as "suggesting that property rights
were poor relations in the world of rights and, as such, much more subject to governmental
intrusion than the rights that more directly safeguard political liberty and equality to insulated
minority groups." Rose, supra note 64, at 580 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the potential
impact of the poor relation metaphor, see Daniel A. Crane, Comment, A Poor Relation?
Regulatory Takings After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 63 U. CmI. L. REv. 199, 218-20 (1996).
Several lower courts and individual judges have quoted Justice Rehnquist's rhetoric in
arguing for more exacting scrutiny of property claims. See NLRB v. Windemuller Elec., Inc., 34
F.3d 384, 394 n.8 (6th Cir. 1994); San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 41
P.3d 87, 128 (Cal. 2002) (Brown, J., dissenting); Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 968
P.2d 993, 1042 (Cal. 1999) (Brown, J., dissenting); Steel v. Cape Corp., 677 A.2d 634, 651-52
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996); L.A. Ray Realty v. Town Council of Cumberland, 698 A.2d 202, 216
(R.I. 1997) (Flanders, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle,
935 P.2d 555, 574 (Wash. 1997) (Durham, C.J., concurring).
169. Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 968 P.2d 993 (Cal. 1999).
170. Id. at 998 ("[O]rdinary rent control statutes are generally constitutionally permissible
exercises of governmental authority.").
171. Id. at 1040-47 (Brown, J., dissenting). Justice Brown would repeat this argument before
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greater deference than a restriction on a liberty interest. Economic freedoms are
no different than other freedoms protected by the Constitution." 172
B. Understanding the Rhetoric of Parity Between Liberty and Property
Interests
The persuasiveness of the judges' rhetoric in the above examples rests on a
metaphor of parity between property and liberty. The metaphor resonates with
us because of the tendency to treat as inherently identical concepts that we
could logically distinguish simply because our society has placed them in the
same category. Because property and liberty are both characterized as rights, a
metaphor of parity between them is initially quite persuasive. When one moves
from the general case to more specific consideration of particular property and
liberty interests, however, the distinctions between the concepts become clearer
and the metaphor loses its rhetorical power.
1. Persuasion Through Reification
The overinclusiveness of categorization cannot be avoided if language is to
simplify the world sufficiently to make communication possible. The
rhetorician Kenneth Burke has explained that "[m]en seek for vocabularies that
will be faithful reflections of reality. To this end, they must develop
vocabularies that are selections of reality. And any selection of reality must, in
certain circumstances, function as a deflection of reality."' 173 Although we can
recognize that linguistic categorization deflects reality by lumping together
distinguishable concepts, the ability rarely comes naturally, particularly to
lawyers trained to reason by analogy and follow precedent. For us, the
172. Santa Monica Beach, 968 P.2d at 1041 (Brown, J., dissenting). Judge Alex Kozinski has
advanced a somewhat similar view, explaining that "the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment's [D]ue
[P]rocess [C]lause protects property no less than life and iberty.... To the extent that arbitrary or
malicious use of physical force violates substantive due process, there is no principled basis for
exempting the arbitrary or malicious use of other governmental powers from similar constitutional
constraints." Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1408409 (9th Cir.
1989) (citation omitted), overruled by Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1325-26 (9th Cir.
1996).
173. KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 59 (Cal. ed., University of California
Press 1969) (1945). For a discussion of this phenomenon in a legal context, see MARK KELMAN, A
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 269-70 (1987) ("All our thoughts are, and seemingly must
be, language mediated, and as soon as we name, we invariably reify in the sense of ascribing
identical traits to objects or situations we could otherwise imagine differentiating simply because
we have given them the same name.").
174. Mark Kelman, Taking Takings Seriously: An Essay for Centrists, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1829,
1847 (1986) (reviewing EPSTEIN, supra note 3) ("[T]he appeal of falsely general categorization
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societal decision to group concepts under a single name communicates a
powerful social commitment to the similarities that led us to create the category
in the first place.
Once embedded in language, categorization easily reifies. We tend to
assume without careful reflection that the outside world somehow dictates the
categorical treatment of separate concepts for all purposes that our society has
chosen to group together for some purposes. "We treat the external world,"
Mark Kelman has explained, "as if it determines our ideas, ascribing false
concreteness to the categories we have in fact invented." 175 Careful reflection on
the interests advanced by a particular categorization is thus required to ensure
that the appeal of balance between similarly named concepts in particular
circumstances in fact has substantive underpinnings.
2. Illustrating and Explaining Reification's Persuasive Force
Two well known cases illustrate how reified legal concepts have been used
to support similar treatment for quite different propositions. First, Richard
Epstein reified the concept of a legal obligation to argue that welfare payments
are unconstitutional takings: "If an individual does not have any obligation to
rescue those in imminent peril when he can do so at little or no cost," Epstein
argued, "then it is not possible to create a welfare obligation with the emergence• • ,,176
of the state, given the representative theory of government. This reasoning is
persuasive precisely because we assume that the justifications for limiting
positive Good Samaritan legal obligations necessarily apply to legal obligations
to pay taxes that support welfare payments. In fact, however, the sort of
disfavored, open ended legal duty to help whenever one observes someone in
need is quite different from a precise obligation to pay taxes to generate a fund
that the government would then use systematically to support the needy.
177
Welfare payments may nonetheless be a bad idea, but not because our notion of
a legal obligation can refer to both Good Samaritan laws and redistributive
taxation.
Second, the concept of property itself refers to a number of distinct
relationships between people and the world, 178 including family homes,
grows in a culture committed to arguments by analogy, slippery slopes, following 'precedent,' and
generalization-the standard 'virtues' of legalisn").
175. KELMAN, supra note 173, at 270.
176. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 324.
177. Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive
Justice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 877, 890-91 & n.38 (1976).
178. Grey, supra note 59, at 28 ("In general, to consider property rules in either functional or
historical terms tends to demystify what remains a powerfully evocative idea, one that if left
unexamined can subsume under the single term 'private property' such very different social and
political phenomena as the immunity of large corporations from government regulation on the one
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businesses, personal property, and intellectual property. This broad
categorization has led commentators and courts to assume that aspects of
property law doctrine applicable to one type of property are necessarily
applicable to another, despite readily understandable differences between
types. 179
Justice Holmes identified such an example in his dissenting opinion in
Truax v. Corrigan.180 In that case, the Court struck down a statute permitting
peaceful labor picketing on the ground that it unconstitutionally intruded upon
the business owner's property rights. 181 "By calling a business 'property,'"
Holmes argued, "you make it seem like land, and lead up to the conclusion that
a statute cannot substantially cut down the advantages of ownership existing
before the statute was passed." 182 Although a business is property, Holmes
maintained it can be differentiated from typical real estate holdings: "[Y]ou
cannot give it definiteness of contour by calling it a thing. It is a course of
conduct and like other conduct is subject to substantial modification according
to time and circumstances both in itself and in regard to what shall justify doing
it a harm."
183
A proper analysis of the right to exclude with respect to business property
should not simply assume that the reasons that society, for example, permits
homeowners to exclude people from their living room apply to business owners.
To be sure, there are similarities. The general understanding that one need not
dedicate private property to advance the cause of another applies to a
homeowner and a business owner. 184 But the privacy concerns of homeowners
are generally stronger than those of business owners. 185 The right to exclude
might also be more applicable to the homeowner because, in Margaret Radin's
words, a personal residence "appear[s] more closely connected with
personhood" than business property generally opened to the public. 186
hand and the ordinary person's expectation of secure possession and free use of personal
belongings on the other.").
179. See supra Part W.A.
180. 257 U.S. 312, 342 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 328, 330.
182. Id. at 342 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 342-43.
184. Kelman, supra note 174, at 1837-38.
185. Id. at 1837.
186. MARGARET JANE RADIN, Diagnosing the Takings Problem, in REINTERPRETING
PROPERTY 146, 156 (1993). Radin argues:
If property is fungible (for example, a large shopping center), we might find that a
statute permitting political speech on the claimant's property is not a taking, even
though it appears to be literally a government action permitting a physical incursion into
the claimant's space and a limit on the claimant's right to exclude. On the other hand, a
[VOL. 60:1
36
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 1 [], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss1/2
SWEET LAND OF PROPERTY
3. The Special Case of the Concept of a Legal Right
The ability of language to mask differences between similarly named
concepts is at its most powerful when we deal with concepts grouped together
as rights. This is true because categorizing something as a right necessarily
discourages careful reflection on the merits of a particular claim. If one has a
right to an attorney, for example, it matters little that a particular guilty
defendant wants to exercise that right to avoid lawful punishment for a crime. A
right can be used for any purpose, good or bad. As Mark Kelman has explained,
"a right is that sort of claim that trumps particularistic dialogue about the
purpose of allowing or disallowing a claim or (falsely) presupposes that some
general purpose is in fact met in each case covered by the right."
187
Although treating the right to counsel, for example, as inviolate, and strictly
scrutinizing any alleged infringement may well be appropriate given the content
of that right, property rights serve very different purposes. That we categorize
both as rights does not conclusively establish that similar scrutiny is appropriate
for each.lA8 Strong property rights advocates must go further and grapple with
the distinct interests involved, demonstrating that strict judicial scrutiny will
serve the particular property interests at issue as well as it serves the particular
liberty interest they are using as the basis for comparison.
Brennan, Rehnquist, and Brown do not meet this test. They equate the
compensation question under the Takings Clause with liberty interests
threatened by police-citizen encounters, limitations on free speech, and
invasions of privacy.189 But these rights differ from property rights in a
fundamental way. Although I am less confident of my ability to articulate this
distinction than of the other points raised in this Article, each of these liberty
rights seems to mediate a one-to-one relationship between person and
government. The extent to which government can detain us, cut off avenues for
speech, and invade private areas is a true individual interest that exists whether
or not we are interacting with others. Property rights, by contrast, are
communal. Although some personal property may be truly private, much of it is
shared in fundamental ways. Our homes are on view for the neighborhood, and
friends and door-to-door solicitors regularly visit. We share rides in our cars and
similar statute directed against homeowners might more readily be understood as a
taking.
Id. (footnote call number omitted).
187. KELMAN, supra note 173, at 274. Of course, one can imagine defeasible rights. Grey,
supra note 177, at 885. A related and more pervasive difficulty often arises because legal terms
tend to have lay meanings that influence their use even in legal contexts. Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J.
16, 21-23 (1913).
188. Kelman, supra note 174, at 1838.
189. See supra Part W.A.
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interact with others driving their cars in the street. The lines between what must
be shared and what can be separated permeate everything that we do. In
truncating their conception of property as a function of individual-government
interaction, the Justices effectively mask the role that property plays in
constituting a community.
C. Liberty and Property in Concrete Cases
The prior section criticizes the Brennan-Rehnquist-Brown rhetoric for
failing to take account of differences between the property rights and the liberty
rights subsumed in their analyses. Recognizing a difference-particularly one
that may not be fully articulated-does not establish that different treatment is
appropriate. Strict scrutiny could, in theory, be appropriate for both property
and liberty claims despite the differences between them.
As discussed below, the Court itself has effectively rejected that possibility.
When faced with cases requiring the Court to apply property and liberty
interests in concrete situations, the rhetoric of parity has lost much of its
persuasiveness and the Court has accorded greater protection to liberty interests.
1. Equal Access to and Free Speech in Quasi-Public Areas
When business owners generally permit the public to use their property, but
seek to exclude a particular individual (1) based on an immutable trait such as
race or (2) because the individual seeks to engage in free speech, liberty and
property rights clash in a much more concrete way than in the three cases
addressed in Part IV.A. The right to exclude is central to an owner's property
rights. 190 Individual liberty generally does not permit one to invade the property
of another. A homeowner may thus exclude some and admit others to the home
for any reason at all and regulate the behavior of those who are admitted with
the threat of expulsion. 191 Property rights trump any liberty interest.
When dealing with business property generally held open to the public (i.e.,
quasi-public property), the liberty interests of those wishing to use the property
may be stronger and the property interests of the owners weaker. In these types
of cases, the Supreme Court has privileged liberty by refusing to find a federal
constitutional mandate protecting the property owner' s right to exclude.
190. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (describing the right to exclude
as "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle" of property rights).
191. See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 161 (Wis. 1997) (awarding
punitive damages for trespass on non-business property despite no actual damage); cf State v.
Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372-73 (N.J. 1971) (finding property rights not broad enough to prohibit
trespass to provide information and government services to migrant workers living on business
property operated as a farm).
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With respect to access, courts have widely rejected Due Process and
Takings Clause challenges to state and federal civil rights acts that compel
owners of business property generally held open to the public to admit everyone
regardless of race.192 With respect to free speech rights on quasi-public
property, the situation has been more complex but no less definitive. In Marsh
v. Alabama,193 the Court upheld the right to distribute religious literature in a• 194
privately owned company town. "When we balance the [c]onstitutional rights
of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and
religion, as we must here," Justice Black wrote for the Court, "we remain
mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position." 195
Subsequently, the Court rejected the notion that free speech rights trump the
property interests of owners of small scale quasi-public property, such as
shopping centers. 196 These decisions, however, held only that the scope of the
liberty interest embodied by the First Amendment did not, of its own force,
extend the right to speak to small scale quasi-public property. Importantly, the
Court did not hold that the Constitution forbids governmentally required access
for free speech purposes. The Court made this distinction clear by unanimously
upholding California's decision to permit free speech activity within privately.• 197
owned shopping centers.
2. Property and Liberty in Criminal and Quasi- Criminal Proceedings
Criminal law raises interesting conflicts among rights because deprivations
of liberty (e.g., prison sentences) and property (e.g, fines) are both part of the
criminal process. In cases dealing with the bedrock rights of the accused-
appointed counsel, trial by jury, and the privilege against self-incrimination-
the Court has often considered whether criminal procedure rights apply equally
192. The Court has specifically rejected both Due Process and Takings Clause challenges to
civil rights acts mandating access to private property. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 259-60 (1964) (explaining that the Court has repeatedly held that "such laws
do not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" and that at least thirty-two
states had civil rights laws mandating access to private property); id. at 261 (rejecting takings
claim).
193. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
194. Id. at 509.
195. Id. (citing Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577 (1944); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943); Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942),
vacated by 319 U.S. 103 (1943)).
196. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518-20 (1976) (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551, 556-70 (1972)), overruling Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
197. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (upholding a state court
decision against a property clause challenge and finding constitutional a state law permitting
distribution of leaflets on private shopping center property).
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to cases in which only the defendant's property is at stake. 198 In each situation,
the Court has protected liberty more vigorously.
a. Counsel and Juries
Criminal prosecutions seeking to impose fines-no matter how large-and
the reputational injury commensurate with a criminal conviction-no matter
how severe-do not trigger the core constitutional rights to court appointed
counsel 19 9 and trial by jury in a criminal case. 200 Instead, both core rights apply
only when at least some level of imprisonment threatens the defendant' s right to
liberty.
With respect to counsel, the Constitution provides no right to court
appointed legal assistance in civil cases even though large property interests are
at stake. In criminal cases, the right to appointed counsel does not apply to
every case.202 Where a defendant is sentenced to serve time-or to probation
that could result in the deprivation of liberty-no matter how short the duration,
the government must have provided appointed counsel to an indigent defendant
or the conviction cannot stand. 203 By contrast, where a court limits its
punishment to a deprivation of property, a criminal fine denying appointed
counsel to an indigent defendant is constitutional. Justice Rehnquist wrote for
the Court, "[W]e believe ... that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in
kind from fines ... and [thus] warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the
line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel." 
2
04
In deciding whether the Constitution requires a jury in a criminal case, a
court must decide whether society finds the crime serious enough to trigger the
right.205 The Supreme Court uses an objective test that asks whether the
198. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (holding that the Constitution
requires the right to counsel only if a state actually incarcerates a defendant).
199. See cases cited infra notes 202-204.
200. See infra notes 205-207 and accompanying text.
201. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963).
202. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373.
203. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002) (holding that a defendant must have
appointed counsel to receive a suspended or probated prison sentence); Glover v. United States,
531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001) ("[A]ny amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance.");
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746 (1994) ("[T]he [constitutional] line [is] between
criminal proceedings that resulted in imprisonment, and those that did not." (citing Scott, 440 U.S.
at 372)); Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74.
204. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373.
205. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968) ("Our conclusion is that in the
American States, as in the federal judicial system, a general grant of jury trial for serious offenses
is a fundamental right, essential for preventing miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair
trials are provided for all defendants.") (emphasis added).
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legislature has set the maximum punishment upon conviction at a length of• • • 206 ..
imprisonment greater than six months. In making this inquiry, the Court has
not looked to the level of any fine or other governmental deprivation of
property:
In evaluating the seriousness of the offense, we place primary emphasis
on the maximum prison term authorized. While penalties such as
probation or a fine may infringe on a defendant's freedom, the
deprivation of liberty imposed by imprisonment makes that penalty the
best indicator of whether the legislature considered an offense to be
"petty" or "serious."207
b. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The Constitution provides a privilege against self-incrimination in federal
criminal cases, 20 and the Court extended that provision to state prosecutions
because the Court deemed the provision essential to protect the liberty interests• .. 209
at stake when an individual faces incarceration. Although the right applies in
all criminal cases, no similar right exists in civil cases no matter how significant
the potential damages.
210
To be sure, the privilege against self-incrimination is sometimes available
to defendants in non-criminal cases, but only to the extent necessary to protect
206. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 512 (1974) ("Our decisions have established a
fixed dividing line between petty and serious offenses: those crimes carrying a sentence of more
than six months are serious crimes and those carrying a sentence of six months or less are petty
crimes." (citing Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S.
147, 149-50 (1969))).
207. Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 326 (1996) (citing Blanton v. City of North Las
Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989)). In civil trials, courts tend to require juries in cases involving
damages, obviously a property issue, but not in cases seeking equitable relief, which may involve
liberty interests (e.g., an equitable order to refrain from certain conduct) or property interests (e.g.,
an order to surrender a particular piece of property). See Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74
HARV. L. REV. 1176, 1179-80 (1961). Unlike criminal cases, however, where the guilty decision is
essentially the same irrespective of remedy, civil actions at law and civil actions in equity raise
different remedial questions. The distinction with respect to juries in civil cases probably resulted
from a sense that chancellors could respond more appropriately than juries to equitable claims
rather than from a belief that property rights were entitled to greater protection than liberty rights.
Id. at 1179-82.
208. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself .... ).
209. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 (1964) (incorporating the privilege against self-
incrimination into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and noting the privilege
as one of the "principles of a free government" (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 632
(1986), abrogated by Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 407-)8 (1976))).
210. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967) (privilege only applies to criminal sanction).
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the witness's liberty interests in a threatened future criminal prosecution.2 11 In
criminal cases, the prosecution is prohibited from urging the jury to draw a
negative inference from the defendant's failure to testify. In a civil case, by
contrast, an attorney may urge the jury to rule in favor of the plaintiff and
thereby impinge the defendant's property rights because the defendant failed toS213 ..
testify. The privilege scrupulously protects liberty interests; property interests
in civil cases do not receive similar protection. In Justice White's terms, "in
criminal cases.., the stakes are higher .... 214
c. Civil Forfeiture of Property Used in the Commission of a
Crime
In civil forfeiture proceedings, the government takes possession and
ownership of private property used in the commission of crime.215 Unlike
criminal proceedings, in which the government must prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt,21 in civil forfeiture proceedings the government need satisfy
only a preponderance of the evidence standard. Further, the government may
take property owned by an individual who had no fault with respect to the. 218
criminal activity without paying any compensation.
211. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316 (1976) (quoting Letkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S.
70, 77 (1973)); cf Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-31 (1956) (quoting Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906)) (rejecting the argument that immunity should not overcome the
privilege because property-based ramifications such as loss of job may still occur).
212. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
213. Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318 ("[T]he Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences
against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered
against them .... ). Civil litigants may also lose their property right to assert a claim if they
remain silent about it during civil litigation. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (requiring certain claims to be
filed as a counterclaim or waived).
214. Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318-19; see Christopher V. Blum, Comment, Self- incrimination,
Preclusion, Practical Effect and Prejudice to Plaintiffs: The Faulty Vision of SEC v. Graystone
Nash, Inc., 61 BROOK. L. REV. 275, 275 (1995) ("[In a criminal prosecution] the defendant may
lose his freedom, not just property." (citing Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318-19)).
215. See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 618-20 (1946) (listing federal statutes
authorizing seizure of contraband).
216. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
217. The Court has repeatedly affirmed the legitimacy of differing burdens of proof in
permitting civil forfeiture to proceed over double jeopardy and collateral estoppel objections where
an owner was not convicted of the underlying crime. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 359-
60 (1990); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984); One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235-36 (1972).
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Each of these examples confirms that the Court scrutinizes claims more
carefully when individual liberty is at stake than when the government threatens
property interests.
V. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS SUPPORTING STRONG PROPERTY RIGHTS
Although neither history nor current legal doctrine compels a regime of
strong property rights, legal scholars have increasingly sought to justify one on
both natural law and utilitarian underpinnings. Natural law theorists argue that
individuals have prepolitical rights to property that governments are morally
obligated to protect regardless of the consequences of doing so. 2 19 Coincident
with the rise of the modern property rights movement, an explicitly
consequentialist, utilitarian justification has emerged for strong property rights.
Adherents to this view maintain that even one who believes that all rights flow
from government should favor strong property rights because these rights in fact
produce a society that is better for everyone.
A. Natural Rights Justifications for Strong Property Rights
Natural rights theorists define the concept of property as a repolitical,
presocial right to acquire, use, and dispose of things or intangibles. Adherents
to this view contend that "government does not create justice; it merely,,222 ,-
recognizes and enforces natural rules of right and wrong., j ommentators
have advanced at least four variants of this theory. First, commentators make a
rather crude all-or-nothing argument that since the failure to recognize any
property rights would fail to respect individual human dignity, a strong property
219. These theorists typically cite Locke's philosophy, in which "citizens retain certain
inalienable rights, held in the pregovernmental state of nature, that the state may not abridge." Paul
Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L.
REv. 1296, 1296-97 (1982). Theorists contrast this view with a "Hobbesian or 'positivist' version,
[in which] citizens entering into civil society relinquish all natural rights and possess only those
rights granted by legislatures and other lawmaking institutions." Id. at 1297.
220. The Court has debated these competing views of property. Compare Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U.S. 312, 328-30 (1921) (Taft, C.J.) (striking down a statute permitting peaceful labor
picketing on the ground that it infringes inherent property rights of business owners), with id. at
342-44 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that government should have the constitutional flexibility
to regulate business in the public interest), and id. at 354-55 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (explaining
that the right to carry on business may be property but is subject to legislative and judicial
regulations which set the rules for competition and noting that these rules change with changing
conditions).
221. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 171 (1974); Claeys, Natural Property
Rights, supra note 12, at 1560-61, 1568.
222. SANDEFUR, supra note 11, at 52.
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rights regime is morally compelled.223 A second version focuses on the
legitimacy of government power, arguing that government cannot possess
powers that individuals do not.224 A third argument draws on Locke's labor
theory of property, 225 and a fourth contends that strong property rights are
essential to individual personality.
226
The standard counterarguments to natural rights theories are well known
and apply fully to each of the arguments for strong property rights. First, there
cannot be natural rights because there is no objective way to determine what
they are; there is no agreement among individuals. 227 Second, even if there were
agreement on a particular set of core rights, it would be contingent on the
culture, law, and custom of a particular society rather than inherent or natural.
228
This section sets out and critiques the specific natural law arguments
advanced by strong property rights advocates.
223. See infra Part V.A.1.
224. See infra Part V.A.2.
225. See infra Part V.A.3.
226. See infra Part V.A.4.
227. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 488 (1921) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("All rights are derived from the purposes of the society in which they exist; above all
rights rises duty to the community."); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Natural Law, in COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 310, 312 (1920) ("The jurists who believe in natural law seem to me to be in that
naive state of mind that accepts what has been familiar and accepted by them and their neighbors
as something that must be accepted by all men everywhere."); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 578 (1971) ("For while some moral principles may seem natural and even obvious, there
are great obstacles to maintaining that they are necessarily true, or even to explaining what is
meant by this .... There is no set of conditions or first principles that can be plausibly claimed to
be necessary or definitive of morality and thereby especially suited to carry the burden of
justification.").
228. Cass Sunstein's Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech contains an accessible
discussion of this point. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH
30-32 (1993). Sunstein cites Franklin Delano Roosevelt's reference to "this man-made world of
ours" which signifies that institutions such as private property and free markets, which we
experience as naturally "prepolitical and presocial," are in fact products of legal systems that we
have created. Id. at 30. We tend to experience existing institutions as independent of government
and regulation of those institutions as government action. See id. at 31. In fact, the existing
institution is as much a product of government as a new regulation would be. See id. Individual
effort and voluntary agreement, of course, are far from irrelevant to one's property holdings, see id.
at 30, "[b]ut the reward of a certain definition of 'effort,' and the protection of that reward by the
state, were emphatically legal." Id. at 30-31. To recognize that law shapes our understanding of
property is not to say that we should reject it. See id. at 32. On the contrary, our society created our
system of property to better the human condition. But just as society made the choice to construct
the property system we have today, it can choose to alter that system. There is no law of nature
preventing the change. See id. The issue is whether the change will in fact better society, not
whether the change will undo some natural arrangement. See id. at 31-32.
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1. All-or-Nothing
A surprisingly prevalent defense of strong property rights conceptualizes
only two potential legal regimes: one of extremely strong protection and one
with virtually no protection at all.229 The argument generally proceeds as
follows: (1) societies with little regard for private property, such as socialist
Eastern Europe, experienced shortages of goods because market forces could
not operate efficiently; (2) to live in conditions of scarcity regardless of
individual effort is an affront to human dignity; and therefore, (3) strong private
property protection is a moral imperative.
This argument conflates the correlation between the affront to human
dignity in totalitarian regimes and the lack of respect for property that those
regimes generally demonstrated. But the two are not necessarily dependent on
each other. One can imagine a regime of strong property rights that showed
little respect for human dignity. A wildly inegalitarian society such as the
antebellum South, for example, had a regime of relatively strong property rights
but nonetheless compensated labor extremely poorly and obviously failed to• 231
respect human dignity. It is the humanity of the governmental system, not just
the approach to property, that matters.
This defense of strong property rights rejects the notion that a society might
develop some intermediate degree of property protection through its law,
custom, and culture as just a slip away from a regime of no property rights at
all. "Played out to its logical conclusion," Sandefur has argued, the notion that
property rights are contingent
means that when a burglar breaks into a person's house, that person's
feelings of humiliation and fear exist only because our society has
229. This view is reflected in the following quote: "History furnishes no instance where the
right of man to acquire and hold property has been taken away without the complete destruction of
liberty in all its forms." WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH, LAWYER'S LAWYER: THE LIFE OF JOHN W.
DAVIS 347 (1973) (quoting Letter from John W. Davis to C.E. Berridge (Sept. 13, 1934) (on file
with the Sterling Library of Yale University)); see also SANDEFUR, supra note 11, at 49
("[D]iminishing property rights causes many of the same effects as abolishing thel only on a
smaller scale."). Epstein's declaration that law cannot fairly apportion property among those
contributing to its creation arises from a similar all-or-nothing view. Epstein, Liberty Versus
Property?, supra note 12, at 7-10 (arguing that we must choose between awarding property
exclusively to the one with the greatest claim or face arbitrariness that will lessen property's value
for all).
230. See SANDEFUR, supra note 11, at 14-19 (using the Shakers and Marxist Russia as
counterpoints to a private property regime); id. at 38 (suggesting that a society that takes property
from one and gives to another is like Communist East Germany in that it is unable to rely on
market pricing to distribute resources).
231. See Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective,
51 STAN. L. REV. 221, 226-27 (1999).
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declared that burglary is illegal-not because the victim' s personal
rights have been violated. Society could just declare that burglary will
now be permitted, and then the victims would not feel violated.
232
This form of reasoning adopts an unrealistically narrow view of the
relationship between society and law. It posits a false choice: Either society
plays no role whatsoever because all rights are innate and natural, or existing
social structures perfectly and fully determine individual personality at the
moment that they are enacted. Any change in law would thus instantaneously
transform societal attitudes. Those advancing this argument presumably intend
the latter option to appear so preposterous that the former must be true.
The relationship between societal attitudes and law is much more complex,
combining both deep, if not inalterable, notions of morality with welfare
analysis. 233 Attitudes are not dictated instantaneously as legislatures pass laws
and courts decide cases, but law, along with culture and custom, nonetheless
contributes to social attitudes about property. 234 Once social expectations
develop with respect to a certain degree of property rights, simply changing the
law cannot eliminate them.235 That attachments are sticky, however, does not
mean that they are natural or that they could not change over time.
236
One might imagine a society in which theft was lawful. In such a society,
property owners would take greater steps to protect their property. A victim of a
burglary would regret not taking more effective precautions, but would not
necessarily feel violated in the way that burglary victims do in American society
today.
Such a society might seem far-fetched. But it has existing analogs. Consider
the approach used by some high-end dealers in antiquarian books: paying a
small fraction of market value for a collection by exploiting the current owner' s
ignorance.237 A less extreme example is car dealers who make varying offers
232. SANDEFUR, supra note 11, at 20.
233. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1849, 1866-67 (2007) ("[S]uccess in justifying an institution on utilitarian grounds does
not foreclose a role for deontology in the institution. This can be seen in the case of those rights
that have even stronger prelegal moral intuitions backing them-civil and human rights. Rights not
to be killed or subject to violence clearly serve an important function in society and are obviously
welfare-increasing. But this is not to say that this is all there is to such rights, that people generally
think about them in these terms, or that they make decisions involving them using utilitarian
calculus.").
234. See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 60-65 (1984).
235. See Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings' Jurisprudence":
The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106
YALE L.J. 613, 641-42 (1996).
236. See id. at 642.
237. Umberto Eco explained the book buying process as follows:
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depending on race or gender. 23 One who is exploited by a book buyer or car
dealer would likely feel foolish, but not violated in the way that a victim of a
burglary does.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council239 demonstrates that a society has choices with respect to how strongly
to protect property rights. There, the Court held that even where a regulation
strips property of all economic value, an exception to the compensation
requirement exists where background property principles support the
regulation. 24  Although Justice Scalia referenced common law nuisance, an
historical ground, as the source of government power, 24 1 it is now clear that
these principles are not limited to historical rules but can develop as a society's• , • , 242
view of property rights evolves.
[A]ntiquarian book dealers.., have certain methods of procuring books .... [T]here is
the vulture method. You identify the great families in decline, with ... the ancient
libraries, and you wait for a father to die, a husband, an uncle, at which point the heirs
already have their hands full selling the furniture and the jewels, and they have no idea
how to appraise that hoard of books they have never examined .... Then you go look at
the books, spend two or three days in those great shadowy rooms, and formulate your
strategy.... Typically you find two or three hundred volumes of no value: you
immediately spot the various [books of little or moderate value].
UMBERTO ECO, THE MYSTERIOUS FLAME OF QUEEN LOANA 56-59 (Geoffrey Brock trans.,
Harcourt, Inc. 2005) (2004). Eco continues that after carefully searching, the dealer may find a few
books of great value. Id. at 57-58. The dealer then says to the owner that there is "a lot of stuff
here, but none of it [is] worth much." Id. at 58. The dealer then makes a low ball offer, knowing
the buyer will reject it, following up with an even lower offer for the ten most valuable volumes.
Id. at 58-59. The owner accepts it because it seems like a lot of money for a small number of
books compared with the prior offer for the entire library. Id. at 59. The opening scene of The
Ninth Gate also depicts such a book buying scam. See Todd R. Ramlow, Ars Diavoli,
POPMATTERS, http://www.popmatters.com/film/reviews/n/ninth-gate.shtml (last visited Oct. 10,
2008) ("Dean Corso (Johnny Depp) is an unscrupulous rare book dealer who, in the opening
scenes, we first see swindling (what we presume is) an Alzheimer victim's family out of a priceless
edition of Cervantes' Don Quixote.").
238. See Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and
Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109, 110 (1995) ("[D]ealers systematically offer lower
prices to white males .... ).
239. 505 U.S. 1003, 1024-25 (1992).
240. Id. at 1027-28 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
241. Id. at 1030-31; see also id. at 1054-55 (Blackman, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the
Court intended to look historically to common law nuisance and perhaps other similarly well
established common law doctrines).
242. In Lucas, the Court indicated that background property principles were not static. Id. at
1027 ("[O]ur 'takings' jurisprudence ... has traditionally been guided by the understandings of our
citizens regarding the content of, and the State's power over, the 'bundle of rights' that they
acquire when they obtain title to property."); id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)
("[Citizens'] reasonable expectations must be understood in light of the whole of our legal
tradition. The common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power
in a complex and interdependent society." (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,
593 (1962))). The Court confirmed the dynamic nature of background property principles nine
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2. Natural Limits on Government Power
A variant of the all-or-nothing natural rights theory argues that, even if
regimes with intermediate levels of property protection are feasible, they would
be illegitimate.243 Within a natural rights framework, the role of the government
is the minimalist one of ensuring that individuals can enjoy their property
without outside interference.2 44 The government can act only as individuals
have authorized it to act and, critically, individuals can authorize no more than
they could do themselves. 245 "Government officials," Sandefur explains, "must
obey the same rules when dealing with us that other people must obey;
constitutional law limits their treatment of us just as tort law regulates the way
that private citizens may interact with us-their authority is limited by our
rights.' 246 Put another way, the government can ask individuals to cover the cost
of the services the government provides, but it may not exact payment for the
benefits of having a government.
247
years after Lucas when Justice Kennedy explained for the Court that a property principle could
arise from any regulation or common law rule that relied on "those common, shared
understandings of permissible limitations derived from a State's legal tradition." Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630 (2001).
243. LOCKE, supra note 50, at 378.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 305-06, 375-76; see EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 331 ("[T]he state's rights against
its citizens are no greater than the sum of the rights of the individuals whom it benefits .... All
questions of public right are complex amalgams of questions of individual entitlements .... ); see
also id. at 36 ("On Lockean principles the government stands no better than the citizens it
represents on whether property has been taken .... ). In modem philosophy, Robert Nozick
provides the classic defense of this view of government. NOZICK, supra note 221, at ix ("[A]
minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement
of contracts, and so on, is justified; that any more extensive state will violate persons' rights not to
be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified .... ); id. at 32-33 ("Why not ... hold that some
persons have to bear some costs that benefit other persons more, for the sake of the overall social
good?... [Because t]here are only individual people, different individual people, with their own
individual lives. Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the
others. Nothing more.... To use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take
account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.") (footnote call
number omitted).
246. SANDEFUR, supra note 11, at 53; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 12-13 ("Every
transaction between the state and the individual can thus be understood as a transaction between
private individuals .... ) (citing Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155,
164 (1980); LOCKE, supra note 50, at 375); id. at 36 (explaining that a governmental taking of
private property occurs whenever the same action, if performed by a private party, would be
treated as a taking); SANDEFUR, supra note 11, at 22 ("Each person is in charge of his own life and
the fruits of his labor[, and] the government exists simply to ensure that people respect each other's
rights.").
247. See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 9-10.
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So limited, the government can only protect property from trespass and
conversion because the individual has the right to protect his own property. Just
as an individual has no claim on the property of another, the government cannot
legitimately redistribute income either through progressive taxation and welfare
payments or through its use of the Takings Clause to eliminate blighted property
or spur economic development.
248
This version of the natural rights theory of property must rest on the notion
that individuals would never consent to empower a government to do what
individuals cannot for fear that the government would exploit that power to the
detriment of the individual. 249 It is far from clear, however, why this must be
so.250 Many individuals (for example, Mother Teresa or Albert Schweitzer)
choose to give their life for the betterment of their society or even other
societies. Though many give from their excess, an appreciable number give
from their need. Soldiers, not of fortune, provide the most common example.
Further, individuals tend to be less willing to spend what they have in order
to advance a social cause than they would agree to defer to advance that same251
cause. For example, many people would refuse to give up half of their net
worth to provide AIDS medicine to sick people in Africa. Yet, these same
individuals would reject an offer of the same amount of money if they knew
that, as a consequence of their accepting, the AIDS medication would not be
distributed. This offer-asking price difference could lead reasonable people to
prefer government redistribution of property because these people know that
once they control the resources, they will not use them to advance social causes
that they are happy to have the government support with their tax dollars.
252
Since individual sacrifice is conceivable and admirable, and enlisting the
government to do good works on one's behalf is a reasonable option, an
alternative to the natural rights world view is also conceivable. Under this
alternate view, individuals might recognize their own weakness-their own
inability to make personal sacrifice for the betterment of their society.
248. See id. at 179, 296-303, 324; SANDEFUR, supra note 11, at 120.
249. This argument often finds support in dicta from the early case Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) ("It is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature
with such powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it.").
250. Support for this view is said to be found in the common law's refusal to force
partnerships. See Epstein, Liberty Versus Property?, supra note 12, at 13 ("[R]elationships of trust
do not work well between individuals who are brought together by happenstance and chance.").
251. See E.J. MISHAN, A Survey of Welfare Economics, 1939-1959, in WELFARE
ECONOMICS: FIVE INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS 3, 68-72 (1964); C. Edwin Baker, Counting
Preferences in Collective Choice Situations, 25 UCLA L. REV. 381 (1978); C. Edwin Baker, The
Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 26-27 (1975); Mark Kelman,
Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV.
669, 678-95 (1979).
252. Proceedings, supra note 15, at 160-61 (statement of Mark Kelman).
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Nevertheless, they may see the virtue in sacrifice and thus agree to extend
powers to the government, allowing it to compel some contribution from
individuals for the betterment of society. In this regard, progressive taxation-
particularly at current levels in the United States-seems a minor sacrifice
compared with something like forced military service in a combat zone.
3. Respect for the Body and Derivative Labor
A more sophisticated version of the natural rights theory of strong property
rights draws on Locke's theory of property, under which individuals are entitled
to retain what they produce.253 Adherents of this view argue that individuals
have a moral entitlement to their own person and capabilities and a moral
obligation to use their talents to produce that which is necessary for humans to
fully flourish.254 As Adam Mossoff has explained, "the right to one's life, limbs
and liberty is an exclusive right" that "cannot be similarly possessed by any
other party."255 The property produced by one's body is then seen as "morally
equivalent to one's (exclusive) right to life and liberty. ' 256 Further, the
production of property through labor, in Mossoff s words, "creates the products
necessary for him to live. Individuals are thus morally required to use their
labor productively and morally entitled to keep the fruits of that labor.
258
The traditional counter to Lockean labor theory is that it artificially
imagines an individual alone with nature and postulates that what a lone
individual creates is rightly his own. 9 However compelling that logic may be,
it bears little resemblance to the real world in which no one stands alone.
Anything that an individual creates builds on the labor of others and adds to the
foundation on which others will build. 26 That one may be entitled to keep what
253. LOCKE, supra note 50, at 305406 ("Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be
common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right
to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his.
Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath
mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
Property.").
254. Mossoff, supra note 24, at 383.
255. Id. at 384 & n.47 (quoting Hugo Grotius, De lure Praedae Commentarius, in 1 THE
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 227 (James Brown Scott ed., 1995) (1604)).
256. Id. at 384; see id. at 396 ("[T]he integrated theory explains why we are interested in
excluding people from these possessory rights: because they represent fundamental entitlements
pre-existing civil society and legal rules.").
257. Mossoff, supra note 46, at 160.
258. Mossoff, supra note 24, at 383 (quoting Grotius, supra note 249, at 322).
259. See id., at 389-91.
260. John Rawls recognized that the distribution of goods depends on talents and abilities
that are shaped "by social circumstances and such chance contingencies as accident and good
fortune. Intuitively, the most obvious injustice of the system of natural liberty is that it permits
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he needs to survive or even flourish does not mean that one is morally entitled
to all of the excess that he generates.
This critique can be extended by recognizing that even our bodies are not
exclusively our own. In a shallow sense, of course, we cannot literally share a
part of our body with another. It surely seems natural that no one may cut off
another's arm without consent. But in a more practical and fully formed sense,
we are morally compelled to share our bodies. Our babies have a moral claim
on our arms to carry them and a mother' s breast to feed them. We are obliged to
care for the sick members of our families. 261 We may substitute money for our
own bodies because we are not all equivalent caregivers, but the moral
obligation is real nonetheless. We are thus morally compelled to share our own
bodies with others in an intimate way, and one, therefore, cannot reason to an
exclusive right to the product of one's labor from some theory of absolute right
to our own bodies.
4. Natural Rights in Personality
An alternative natural rights theory posits property as essential to,, 262
personality. Only by using our capabilities to create do we constitute
ourselves as free individuals. Without property rights in our creations, this
argument runs, we cannot be ourselves in the fullest possible sense.263 This
position justifies the freedom to create, but not private property. Much of what
we create is not property. Like a drawing in the sand, erased by the wind and
surf, our impression on our children, and indeed everyone around us, is most
fundamental to self-creation. Yet, it leaves us as soon as we act. Our inability to
capture our effect on the world is not fatal to our ability to form our personality.S 264
The same is true for tangible creations.
distributive shares to be improperly influenced by these factors so arbitrary from a moral point of
view." RAWLS, supra note 227, at 72. Even if efforts are made to control socially contingent
factors such as educational opportunity, the distribution of wealth is still "to be determined by the
natural distribution of abilities and talents.... [D]istributive shares are decided by the outcome of
the natural lottery; and this outcome is arbitrary from a moral perspective." Id. at 74.
261. Courts sometimes even legally enforce this duty. See Swoap v. Superior Court, 516 P.2d
840, 852 (1973) (upholding the constitutionality of a law requiring support payments by adult
children for government aid given to their needy parents).
262. G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 48 (S.W. Dyde trans., Prometheus Books
1996) (1896) ("A person must give to his freedom an external sphere, in order that he may reach
the completeness implied in the idea.").
263. Id. at 53 (explaining that property is the embodiment of personality).
264. See Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of
Property Rights and Ideal Objects, in COPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 43, 57-68 (Adam Thierer & Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr. eds., 2002).
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B. Consequentialist-Utilitarian Justifications for Strong Property Rights
In part because of weaknesses in natural rights theories, movement
adherents now advance a consequentialist-utilitarian defense of strong property
rights.265 This approach replaces a sense of moral entitlement to the fruits of
one's labor with a confidence that strong property rights will in fact redound to
the benefit of society in more explicit welfare terms.266 Adherents of this view
sometimes reason that a strong property rights regime creates certainty that
benefits society directly by reducing risk bearing costs and indirectly by
spurring greater productive efforts than would occur in a regime with more• . 267
uncertain government intervention.
Alternatively, a consequentialist may articulate empirical evidence that a
strong property rights regime in fact serves a society's interest better than a• • •268
more interventionist scheme. Those commentators claiming to offer such a
justification, however, tend to fall back on debunked assumptions about
certainty and fail to rebut empirical claims that strong property rights would
have significant negative effects.
26 9
1. Certainty and Incentives as a Consequential Benefit of Strong
Property Rights
A consequentialist proponent of strong property rights concedes that
productive creativity cannot be attributed to individual effort alone. Rather, each
of us stands on the shoulders of the giant that is our society and that makes our
creations possible. 27 Nevertheless, we assign property rights based on mere
possession, regardless of individual effort, to create a more certain regime that
provides incentives for individuals to convert unproductive assets into
property.271 "[T]he real task," Epstein argues, "is to adopt a rule that requires as
265. SANDEFUR, supra note 11, at 31-38; Epstein, Author's Retrospective, supra note 12, at
417; Epstein, Liberty Versus Property?, supra note 12, at 28 ("[F]or years now, my own private
campaign has been to insist that the strength of the natural law theories rested on their implicit
utilitarian (broadly conceived) foundations, which require some empirical evaluation of why given
institutions promote human flourishing, and through it-general social welfare.").
266. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property?, supra note 12, at 28.
267. See infra Part V.B.1.
268. See infra Part V.B.3.
269. See infra note 295.
270. RAWLS, supra note 227, at 72.
271. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 11; SANDEFUR, supra note 11, at 37 ("By rewarding people
for their hard work, private property rights create incentives for people to exchange those rights in
productive pursuits that ultimately benefit society in general."); Epstein, Law Versus Property?,
supra note 12, at 12-14. But see Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Privatizing the Commons: An
Improvement?, 50 S. ECON. J. 438, 444-48 (1983) (arguing that competition for resources can be
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little labor as possible ... so that the owner can be confident that he will be
able, by holding on to the external object, to keep the benefit of the labor that he
creates."272 Consequentialist proponents find this approach to be certain because
once one passes the relatively modest stage of taking possession, he knows that
increases in the value of the property will redound to him. By maximizing the
retained value, the strong property rights regime optimizes the incentives to use
property productively, thereby benefitting society. Requiring additional effort to
obtain property rights, by contrast, would prolong the period of uncertainty and
reduce the value of the rights so obtained, thereby reducing the incentive to
make the effort. 273 Since such a regime of strong property rights would, ex ante,S274
benefit everyone, its adherents believe it to be Pareto superior to other
regimes.
2. Critique of the Certainty and Incentives Based Defense of Strong
Property Rights
Any system that protects property rights may be Pareto superior to a state of275
nature. But one making only Pareto optimal trades cannot choose among
inefficient because it encourages excessive expenditure); Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession
and the Design of the Law, 38 J.L. & ECON. 393, 395-409 (1995) (modeling conditions under
which first possession rules can instigate wasteful racing behavior).
272. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property?, supra note 12, at 15; see also id. at 9-10 ("[T]he
consequentialist situation.., seeks, as I would have it, to create rules that in the long run create
win-win situations-call these Pareto improvements-for the vast run of the population. Each of
us, ex ante, is better off waiving any inchoate claims against the labor of others on condition that
they waive their claims in return. The purpose of this massive renunciation of weak class claims is
not to guarantee some perfect allocation of the goods of the universe. It is the more mundane task
to identify at low cost clear owners of labor so as to assure the security of investment and exchange
that promotes long-term productive wealth."); see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A
COMPLEX WORLD 59-63 (1995) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, COMPLEX WORLD].
273. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property?, supra note 12, at 19 ("[T]he key task of the system is
to reduce the [cost] that is required to [obtain] private ownership [because requiring] individuals to
expend labor that is equal in value to the property acquired reduces the value of the property to
zero ... [, and] from an ex ante perspective, it is in society's best interest to have as few barriers to
the creation of private ownership as possible."); id. at 9-10 ("[I]dentify[ing] at low cost clear
owners of labor ... assure[s] the security of investment and exchange that promotes long-term
productive wealth."); id. at 14-16 (discussing how easy acquisition permits a proper assessment of
temporal property development decisions) (citing Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805);
LOCKE, supra note 50, at 306-07, 316-17).
274. A Pareto superior regime is said to be efficient and stable because no further mutually
beneficial trades can be made. Vilfredo Pareto, Manuel D'Economie Politique, in UTILITY
THEORY: A BOOK OF READINGS 168, 175 (Alfred N. Page ed., 1968); see also AMARTYA K. SEN,
COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 21-22 (K. Arrow et al. eds., 1970) (explaining the
concept of Pareto optimality).
275. Whether a system of pure private property was more efficient than a state of nature
would depend on a greater number of variables than the state of legal entitlement. See Duncan
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various property regimes because any move will make some members of the
society worse off. For example, those without the means to accumulate
substantial amounts of private property would likely be better off in a regime
with welfare rights, and those who would fund welfare rights would likely be
better off, at least monetarily, in a regime without them.
276
One might interpret the utilitarian defense of strong property rights as,
though perhaps not efficient in the strict Pareto sense, nevertheless providing
greater overall utility as a result of systemic benefits in the form of certainty,
which is desirable in itself and which facilitates incentives to engage in
productive activity. As Duncan Kennedy and Frank Michelman demonstrated in
the early 1980s, however, a regime that protects property rights rigorously is not
more certain-nor does it necessarily provide greater incentives toward
productive activity-than a system with extensive government regulation.
277
Starting with the incentives point, property rights adherents assert that
individuals will work harder if they are certain of keeping what they produce.
But that is a hypothesis, not an empirical truth. Individuals may work even
harder in a less certain environment to be better prepared if regulation causes
them to lose some of their property. 27 Most likely, people will respond to
varying degrees of property rights protection in different ways depending on
their position in society and tolerance for risk.
As for certainty itself, property rights adherents tend to ignore that a
capitalist market economy requires a great deal of coordination to operate
efficiently. Where individual property owners have complete control over their
property interests, they can act strategically in ways that disrupt the necessary. . 279
coordination. By contrast, a regime in which the government compels parties
to deal with each other may be considerably more certain. For example, a
system in which the government treated the sky over privately held land as
Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711,
715-39 (1980) (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111-14 (C.K. Ogden ed.,
Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1987) (1931); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *1, *2;
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.1, at 27-28 (2d ed. 1977); JEAN JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, A Discourse on the Origin of lnequality, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES
175, 249-52 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1950)).
276. Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 275, at 716 n.7 (concluding that "it is plain without
argument" that Pareto optimality cannot select among state of nature, private property, and
enforced sharing government regimes); Pefialver, supra note 12, at 435-36 (quoting Richard A.
Epstein, One Step Beyond Nozick's Minimal State: The Role of Forced Exchanges in Political
Theory, 22 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 286, 299 (2005)).
277. Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 275.
278. Id. at 719.
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private air space would be virtually nonadministrable. Yet, with a regime of
government enforced sharing, air space rights are quite stable and certain.
More fundamentally, one system of legal entitlements cannot be inherently
more certain than another. As Wesley Hohfeld first explained, lawyers tend to
use the term right to encompass at least two separate concepts: a privilege,
which is an individual entitlement with which the government may not
interfere; and a right, which is an individual entitlement to call upon the
government to stop others from doing something.28 1 Individuals have a privilege
to engage in free speech, and individuals have a right to exclude trespassers
from their real property.282 A privilege, then, is something that no other person
has a right to call upon the government to stop. 283 If person A has a privilege to
speak in a public forum, then person B might be said to have a non-right to call
284upon the government to stop A from speaking. The correlative legal• • • 285 ..
entitlement to a right is a duty. If A has a right to exclude individuals from
real property, then B has a duty to stay off of A's property unless invited.
286
By focusing on the scope of rights and privileges, one can see that if A has a
property right in relation to some thing, then others cannot have a privilege in
relation to that same thing; a right means that the holder may call upon the
government to stop another from interfering with the right, and a privilege
means that no one can invoke government assistance in the event of a dispute.
If A's property right is weakened-others may use a thing that A owns in some
ways and A cannot call upon the government to stop the use-the original no-
privilege position of others with respect to A's property is strengthened as they
acquire a privilege that precisely maps A's loss of a right.
By increasing the strength of private property rights, a government does not
increase certainty, it merely shifts uncertainty from owners to nonowners. If
owners are certain of their ability to stop others from invading their property,
nonowners are uncertain of the extent to which they can use owned property.
This uncertainty results because the holding of a right does not require its use. A
nonowner in a regime of strong property rights does not know when an owner
will invoke his right.
As property rights become weaker, owners' certainty is reduced because
situations arise in which they cannot call upon the government to exclude
others. For example, the government might require owners to permit free speech
281. See Hohfeld, supra note 187, at 30-33.
282. See id.
283. See id. at 32-33.
284. See id.
285. Id. at 31.
286. Id. at 32.
287. Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 275, at 759-60 (quoting Arthur L. Corbin, Legal
Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163, 166 (1919)).
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on their property. But this increases the certainty of nonowners because they
now know of situations in which they can use another's property without fear
that the state will intervene to exclude them. As Kennedy and Michelman
concluded, "[t]he sum of the legally determined exposures is a constant."
288
Since we are virtually all property owners and we all use the property of others
for various purposes, we are all affected by whatever uncertainty permeates
whichever system that we have.
3. The Empirical Defense of Strong Property Rights
That legal entitlements cannot fundamentally alter the level of uncertainty
over property use does not mean that all entitlement schemes yield an equal
level of social utility. On the contrary, some will be better than others. But one
must measure the schemes empirically based on how people feel about their
lives under particular legal regimes. One cannot simply conclude that certainty
and productive incentives render a strong private property rights regime
superior to one permitting extensive regulation.
Epstein has recently acknowledged the shortcomings of the certainty-
incentive defense of strong property rights. A property rights regime resting on
broadly conceived utilitarian foundations, he acknowledges, "require[s] some
empirical evaluation of why given institutions promote human flourishing, and• • ,,290
through it-general social welfare. Strong rights to exclude, he recognizes,
impose "heavy costs."291 But the alternative regulatory state, he contends,• ,,.,,292
would simply "impose[] heavy costs of governance. One cannot say on a
priori grounds which set of costs and benefits yields the greatest utility. In
Epstein's words, "[t]here is no magic solution for liberty or property that creates
benefits without dislocations.
' 293
At the time that he published Takings in the mid-1980s, Epstein's empirical
defense of its thesis was quite general, focusing on the benefits of certain
ownership claims that facilitate market transactions and the harms of rent
seeking and moral hazard implicit in government regulation.294 A number of
288. Id. at 760.
289. Id. at 762.




294. Epstein argues that the first possession rule provides certainty because it requires a
sufficient expenditure of resources to permit clear identification of claims of exclusive ownership
while permitting the maximum feasible flexibility for voluntary transactions. EPSTEIN, supra note
3, at 61. A requirement of compensation to anyone who loses welfare as a result of a government
action ensures that no individual can gain rents by the government taking wealth from one party
and transferring it to another. Id. at 199. Prohibiting redistribution is also necessary to reduce the
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scholars from across the political spectrum found his utilitarian case for strong
property rights facially plausible but wanting in specifics.295 Although certainty
may in general be good and rent seeking and moral hazard bad, one cannot
universally conclude that the negative effects of regulation will always
outweigh the benefits. 296
Since Takings, neither Epstein, nor anyone else whose work that I have
found, has made much progress. 297 Epstein has acknowledged that regulation is
a superior alternative in certain cases, such as administering waterways. 298 His
conclusion that strong property rights are still appropriate most of the time,
however, has continued to fall back on the same assumptions that have
motivated the consequentialist defense of strong property rights for nearly a
quarter century. 299
moral hazard concern that individuals who can benefit from government action will reduce their
level of productive behavior. Id. at 310 (noting that unemployment insurance can create a moral
hazard that employees will seek to end employment); id. at 320 (expressing the same concern
regarding welfare payments).
295. Larry Alexander argued that Epstein's use of a natural rights framework limited his
utilitarian analysis, and he thus concluded "[t]here is a chance the utility thesis is correct, but it is
surely unproven." Larry Alexander, Takings of Property and Constitutional Serendipity, 41 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 223, 232 (1986). Others were less charitable. Thomas Grey referred to Epstein's
utilitarian analysis as "a cocktail-party empiricism," Grey, supra note 59, at 40 (arguing that
Epstein's utilitarian theory is as vague as those he rejects). Mark Kelman described it as "a wholly
ungrounded assertion of faith that is almost surely wrong." Kelman, supra note 174, at 1852.
296. In this regard, Kelman addressed Epstein's claims with respect to welfare, price control,
and land development. Kelman, supra note 174, at 1852-58 (citing Just v. Marinette County, 201
N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972)).
297. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, COMPLEX WORLD, supra note 272, at 67-70 (recognizing the need
for some common property but not drawing a line) (citing JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES § 2.1, at 55-51
(Peter Birks & Grant McLeod trans., 1987) (535 A.D.); Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in
the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 26347 (1990)); Richard
A. Epstein, Let "The Fundamental Things Apply": Necessary and Contingent Truths in Legal
Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1311-12 (2002) (identifying "the optimal mix between
private and common property" as a critical question but offering no specific empirical arguments
for determining the mix).
298. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property?, supra note 12, at 12 (arguing that consequentialist
grounds justify keeping some resources, such as waterways, as common property) (quoting
LOCKE, supra note 50, at 309).
299. For example, Epstein's recent justification for assigning property individually based on
first possession, rather than proportionally based on creative effort, relies on the same general
assumptions that he relied on in Takings. Id. at 9 ("It would be so defective that it is in the long-run
interest of everyone to abandon any effort to isolate and reallocate the unearned increment (or
decrement) that attaches to human labor. Therefore, a rough and ready rule that follows the naive
sense of desert works better in practice than any overt system that seeks to divert wealth to other
individuals, who are less deserving than the person whose labor created the wealth in question
within the rules of the game.").
2008]
57
Semeraro: Sweet Land of Property?: The History, Symbols, Rhetoric, and Theo
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
4. Considerations Cutting Against Empirical Justification of Strong
Property Rights
Three empirical considerations weigh in favor of deference to regulation.
Justice Stevens originally recognized the first two in response to Justice
Brennan's rhetoric equating police officers and land use planners. These two
considerations tend to show that strict scrutiny of land use decisions would have
a greater inhibiting effect on the ability of planners to perform their
governmental function than strict review of Fourth Amendment claims has on
the police. The third consideration addresses administrative concerns with
respect to strict scrutiny of property claims vis-it-vis First Amendment and
criminal procedure claims. It maintains that stricter scrutiny of property based
claims would impose a greater administrative burden on the courts than it has in
other areas.
a. The Nature of the Decision
The nature of the constitutional inquiry differs in property rights cases and
criminal proceedings. The Court has managed to work towards relatively clear,
enforceable rules in criminal cases. 30 By contrast, the Court uses much vaguer
standards with regard to property rights. As Justice Stevens has argued, "the
Court has repeatedly recognized that it itself cannot establish any objective rules
to assess when a regulation becomes a taking." 30 1 Strict scrutiny in property
rights cases would simply convert the discretion now placed in expert land use
planners, or legislatures with access to broad fact finding authority through the
legislative hearing process, to inexpert courts with more limited fact finding
tools.
One could, of course, imagine a clear, administrable rule that required
compensation for every regulation. But for good reason, no one argues for302 ..
that. Property rights advocates recognize that some things require regulation,
for instance nuisance and strategic behavior, and thus a more nuanced rule
300. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 45843 (1981) (discussing the need for clear
rules in criminal procedure cases and adopting such a rule to cover searches incident to the arrest
of the occupant of a car).
301. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 341 n.17 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
302. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1382-83 (1993)
(discussing the economic case for creating exceptions to absolute rights of exclusion and showing
that the law has adopted exceptions of this type) (citing McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922);
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *208, *212-13).
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would be required. 30 3 Justice Scalia's background-property-principles approach
is one attempt to encapsulate the necessary exceptions to a blanket
compensation requirement into a clear rule.304 More than a decade after its
adoption, however, no clear rules have emerged.
30 5
This distinction is critical to the ability of public servants to do their job.
With relatively clear rules, the police can operate within a framework in which
they can readily distinguish permissible conduct from conduct that raises
constitutional questions. Strictly scrutinizing property rights claims within a
regime without clear rules would require planners to truncate the scope of their
regulatory conduct significantly to ensure against successful constitutional
challenge. If one has already determined that regulation is a social harm, then
this result may not be a bad thing.306 But if some regulation is necessary, then
inhibiting planners with uncertainty may have significant negative
consequences.
b. The Nature of the Remedy for Unconstitutional Conduct
Justice Stevens has also identified a significant difference in the remedies
applied when police and planners violate liberty and property rights,
respectively: Fourth Amendment violations rarely give "rise to civil
liability[, because] police officers enjoy individual immunity for actions taken
303. Thomas Grey made this point in a debate with Epstein shortly after Epstein's Takings
book came out:
The oldest trick in the book is the one he just elucidated. You make the affirmative case
relatively formal and then you build in defenses that are highly informal and you claim
that you have a formal standard.... What we're interested in is ultimate liability. Now
it's one thing to have a rule that is formally realizable and has a little exception that is
vaguely phrased. It's another thing to do what he does. The first step in his analysis is
the taking step, which is vast and covers almost everything the government might do.
But he then has an enormous exception-implicit in-kind compensation-which covers
most of the interesting and politically controversial cases, and which is grossly informal.
At that point you have an informal doctrine, and you have lost the rule of law virtues.
Proceedings, supra note 15, at 84 (commentary of Thomas Grey).
304. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
305. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 629-30 (2001) (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1029-30; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 & n.2 (1987)).
306. See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 95 (finding zoning to be an illegitimate function of
government). As Margaret Radin has explained, one's view of the chilling impact of damage
liability in inverse condemnation cases is a function of one's view of the legitimacy of
governmental land use planning. Margaret Jane Radin, Evaluating Government Reasons for
Changing Property Regimes, 55 ALBANY L. REV. 597, 600-03 (1992) (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at
837; id. at 842-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting)); see also KELMAN, supra note 107, at 45 n.64
("Whether one believes the state is really solving a problem or engaging in a plan of extortion
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in good faith.... Moreover, municipalities are not subject to civil liability for
police officers' routine judgment errors." 30 7 At the municipal level, however,
where much of land use planning occurs, every official decision could give rise
to substantial liability in the form of compensation to every landowner affected
by the unlawful regulation as well as damages, because courts would likely
view every planning board decision as a municipal policy or practice.
Although planners would not be personally liable, the potential for massive,
potentially community crippling public liability would nonetheless chill
governmental land use programs much more severely than careful scrutiny of




c. Administrative Considerations When Enforcing Property and
Liberty Rights
Enforcing the Takings Clause in the same fashion that the Court currently
scrutinizes free speech and privacy claims under the First and Fourth
Amendments, respectively, would create significant additional administrative
costs. Government restrictions on speech are-and should be given the
310Constitution's language -quite rare. One need not be concerned about
restraining, for example, Congress's ability to limit free speech because a
legislator should only rarely consider such a provision. In the rare case in which
a governmental body contemplates enacting such a restriction, it should plan for
the time and expense of searching judicial review.
Prosecutions raising criminal procedure questions, by contrast, are
commonplace. But they arise within an established judicial system in which the
underlying liability of the defendant must in all events be subject to careful
judicial scrutiny. Incorporating regular judicial review of searches, seizures, and
interrogations thus imposes what has proven to be a manageable incremental
burden on an existing judicial system.
307. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 341 n.17 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
308. Id.
309. Id. at 340-41 & n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The policy implications of today's
decision are obvious and, I fear, far reaching. Cautious local officials and land-use planners may
avoid taking any action that might later be challenged and thus give rise to a damages action. Much
important regulation will never be enacted, even perhaps in the health and safety area."); Corwin
W. Johnson, Compensation for Invalid Land-Use Regulations, 15 GA. L. REV. 559, 594 (1981)
("The chaotic state of taking law makes it especially likely that availability of the damages remedy
will induce land-use planning officials to stay well back of the invisible line that they dare not
cross."). See John Mixon, Compensation Claims Against Local Governments for Excessive Land-
Use Regulations: A Proposal for More Efficient State Level Adjudication, 20 URB. LAW. 675, 686
(1988).
310. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law .....
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Regulation affecting property value, like criminal procedure issues, but
unlike speech restricting legislation, is quite common. Were courts to strictly
scrutinize every regulation affecting property value, they could not piggyback
on an existing system. An entirely new block of cases would be thrust upon the
courts, imposing significant administrative costs.
One might respond that the whole purpose of a strong property rights
regime is to reduce government intervention and, thus, ultimately the number of
potential disputes. As the above discussion makes clear, however, eliminating
all regulation is not a realistic option. In some areas, a regulated regime seems
essential-airspace, water rights, public rights of way-and, in many others, the
in-kind benefits would justify a collective approach under any measure. The
notion that one could impose a regime of strong property rights that could
quickly identify the legitimate areas of government regulation from the
illegitimate ones would require explication which to date does not exist.
VI. CONCLUSION
A regime of strict judicial scrutiny of property regulation has never been
part of American society' s understanding of property. From the wording of the
Constitution itself, to our choice of symbols, to the laws our federal, state, and
local legislatures have enacted, Americans have held property and liberty in
separate spheres. Those who seek to unify property and liberty must
demonstrate empirically why we would be better off in a world where
government actors were prevented from affirmatively seeking to better our
society. To date, the case remains unmade.
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